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Summary 
The main objective is to explain whether increased creditworthiness leads to decreased 
average interest rates. The creditworthiness is represented by Bisnode’s credit rating codes. 
Involved in the study are Norwegian limited liability companies. The assessment extends 
from 2005 to 2011, and the analyses were executed for each year separately. The motivation 
has been to verify if creditors are covering credit risk responsibly by requiring an amount of 
compensation, in the form of an interest rate, which is at par with the perceived level of 
company credit risk.  
The credit rating codes are divided into five categories and regression analysis has been 
applied in order to detect whether the differences between the interest rate per credit rating 
code are statistically and economically significant.  
Almost all interest rate differences between the credit rating codes are found statistically 
significant. The findings do not apply to the interest rate difference between AAA- and AA-
rated companies or between AA- and A-rated companies, due to insignificant results. The 
order of the differences is as expected. C-rated companies carry higher interest rates than B-
rated companies, which carry higher interest rates than A-rated companies, etc. The 
economic significance is considered high due to the large size of the interest rate differences 
and because credit rating code changes are detected frequently. This proves that firms 
extending credit rating codes contribute to enable well-functioning credit markets between 
debtor and creditor on the capital market.  
One of the limitations of this thesis has been the aggregated level of the interest rates. When 
executing further research, it would be advantageous to access less aggregated data and also 
to increase the sample size. In to obtain more accurate average interest rate calculations, the 
interest rates should be weighed according to the size of the relevant firm’s interest-bearing 
debt.   
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Introduction 
1.1 The importance of credit ratings 
Credit ratings are widely recognized measures of relative credit risk (S&P, 2011). They are 
applied on people, entities and single debt instruments as well as on sovereigns. Employers 
of such information may be both (potential) employees, customers, suppliers, credit 
extenders, auditors and the public (Gjesdal, 1980). This paper focuses on companies as credit 
rating objects and how their received credit rating codes may affect their average cost of 
capital. More specifically, the focal point is the credit rating’s effect on the cost of debt, i.e. 
the effect on the average interest rate.  
When a company is in the market for credit, its creditworthiness is evaluated. The evaluator 
could be the counterparty himself or an external agency. “Creditworthiness risk is the 
uncertainty surrounding a firm’s ability to service its debts and obligations” (Benhayoun, 
Chairi, El Gonnouni, & Lyhyaoui, 2013, p. 105). Receiving a relatively favorable credit 
rating code signalizes low credit risk and thus a relatively smaller probability of company 
default. Consequently, the credit extender may require a lower interest rate and the company 
with the favorable rating code reduces its cost of debt. The number of players willing to 
extend credit to the company may also increase, leading to an increased ability to access 
cheap capital, perform competitive business and to stay in the market as a worthy participant.  
Credit rating codes may also contribute to facilitate more efficient decision making. Entities 
entering into contracts containing credit deals may encounter problems regarding adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The borrower has more knowledge of his own creditworthiness 
than the lender has, and this may lead to information asymmetry (Skarsvåg, 2005). However, 
credit rating agencies, CRAs, are said to be “financial intermediaries between borrowers and 
lenders” (Shahzad, 2013, p. 2). Information asymmetry and information costs can be 
reduced, thus facilitating trust and making the market more efficient and transparent (Taylor, 
2013). This enables companies and governments to raise money in the capital markets. 
Credit rating codes even play a regulatory role in conjunction with investment restrictions 
and regarding the calculation of banks’ minimum capital requirement.  
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Credit rating codes have the power to influence financial decision making. Consequently it is 
of interest to gain more knowledge on the topic, leading to the introduction of the research 
question.  
1.2 The research question 
This thesis investigates the relationship between a company’s creditworthiness and the 
interest rate. The research question reads as follows: 
Does increased creditworthiness lead to a reduced interest rate? 
The hypothesis is that there is an inverse relationship between the creditworthiness, 
represented by the credit rating codes, and the interest rate, and that this relationship is 
statistically significant
1
. In order to pave the way for the research question, underlying issues 
such as what is creditworthiness and what is an interest rate, emerge. The purpose of this 
paper is to answer the principal research question and to verify the hypothesis. The economic 
consequences of these findings are also addressed.  
1.3 The foundation 
In order to answer the research question, an accounting database collected by the Norwegian 
School of Economics, NHH, and the Centre for Applied Research at the Norwegian School 
of Economics, SNF, is applied. Having this data base at hand enables the study of the 
relationship between the creditworthiness, communicated through credit rating codes, and 
the interest rate, also applying control variables. The relationship between these variables is 
portrayed in figure 1.1, and further developed throughout this paper. An expanded 
illustration is presented after all relevant variables have been described.  
 
Figure 1.1 The foundation 
                                                 
1 When applying the word significance in this thesis, it refers to statistical significance if not otherwise stated. 
Credit rating codes 
and  
 control variables 
Interest rate 
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1.4 The structure 
This thesis begins with a theoretical framework, constituting its backbone. Firstly the 
dependent and the independent variables in the study are addressed. Secondly, the demand 
and supply for credit rating codes are laid out through a sub-section referring to credit rating 
players. Thereafter follows a segment explaining credit rating calculation methods and how 
they are communicated through coding schemes. Lastly, potential control variables and the 
hypothesis of this thesis are elaborated upon. Succeeding the theoretical framework, 
information on the data set and methods applied follows. In the fourth section, the results are 
documented and in the fifth they are discussed. Implications are also conferred in section 
five, including suggestions for further research. The conclusion completes the thesis.   
On the next page follows a model of the structure.  
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Figure1.2 The structure of the thesis 
 
The left grey area in figure 1.2 shows a continuous focus on the dependent and independent 
variables as well as the control variables. The additional areas covered are illustrated on the 
right, supporting the analysis of the relationship between the variables on the left, leading to 
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2. Theoretical framework 
As illustrated in figure 1.1, the major parameters applied in order to either reject or ratify the 
research question in this thesis are the average
2
 interest rate, the credit rating codes and the 
control variables. Theoretical framework on these variables is presented below.  
2.1 The dependent variable, the interest rate 
A rate of interest may be defined as “the per cent of premium paid on money” (Fischer, 
1930, pp. 13-14). Even though this was written in 1930, it still applies. The premium is 
calculated based on money traded between present and future. This money is also called 
credit. Credit can take different forms, have different maturities, be retrieved for different 
reasons, originate from different sources and carry different amounts of credit risk. All these 
factors influence the size of the interest rate.  
The reporting of multiple types of credit following below is not all-encompassing as this is 
not the purpose. The purpose is to make the reader aware of the vast amount of sources of 
credit, i.e. sources of interest rate, which exist. This understanding is beneficial for further 
reading.  
There are many ways to categorize credit. One may, for example, apply characteristics 
describing durance or purpose or divide between credit that bears interests and those that do 
not. The following breakdown distinguishes between purposes, i.e. company needs, and also 
mentions the credit’s link to durance.  
Firstly, companies may need credit in order to finance daily operations. These credits are of 
a more short-termed character. Secondly, companies need credit for larger investments in 
non-current assets, often more long-termed. Examples of the former type of credit are 
accounts receivables and inventory. These are called current assets. Costs may also arrive 
sooner than the income, thus obliging companies to obtain credit. This especially concerns 
companies influenced by seasonal changes. Various expenses connected to current assets 
may be covered by credit lines, confirming, market financing, factoring or by promissory 
                                                 
2 Occasionally, the “average” is referred to as the “mean”. 
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notes. These are short-term financial solutions. A line of credit is used by companies in order 
to withstand short-term liquidity fluctuations. The interest rate paid is often a combination of 
the interests on the amount used and on the given credit limit. The second short-term debt 
mentioned, confirming, defines credit obtained to cover inventory (Kronborg & Thoresen, 
1985). Market financing describes two players interacting on the market, with or without a 
broker, borrowing money from each other. The interest rate paid is often higher than what a 
creditor could achieve by putting the money in the bank or purchasing bonds (Banken & 
Busch, 1986). In this thesis, a creditor refers to the “one to whom a debt is owed” 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014), whether this creditor is a financial institution or any other 
company issuing credit for a fee. Factoring is when one company, the “factoring company”, 
purchases another company’s accounts receivables. Promissory notes simply describe when 
credit is issued in exchange for interest rate and principals.  
Non-current assets are, for example, real estate, machines and transport. For these purposes, 
longer-term loans, and often larger loans, are necessary. Commercial banks, savings banks, 
pension funds as well as life insurance and general insurance companies are possible 
creditors. In the banking industry in Norway, 67 per cent of business loans are offered by 
commercial banks, 23 per cent from savings banks, six per cent from credit institutions and 
four per cent from others. The limited liability companies represent 91 per cent of the 
demand toward loans from these financial institutions (Mjøs & Phan, 2011).  
In order to meet the demand for long-term credit, banks issue several products. Among other 
products, they include mortgage loans, construction loans, promissory notes, bonds, 
convertible loans and leasing. For (commercial) real estate, mortgage loans are frequently 
applied, taking security in the estate. Construction loans have similar characteristics as credit 
lines. The debtor pays provisions on the credit limit agreed upon as well as interests on the 
credit which is drawn (Kronborg & Thoresen, 1985). In addition to banks, bond issuers also 
comprise states, municipalities and other large limited liability companies. Bonds are loans 
divided into parts where both individuals, companies, banks and others may buy one or more 
bonds (Lederkilden). If a creditor needs the money back, the bond may be sold on a 
secondary market (Kronborg & Thoresen, 1985). Regarding bonds, the credit spread is often 
mentioned. This is the “positive yield spread over a comparable-maturity Treasury bond” 
(Ng & Phelps, 2011, p. 63). The spread compensates investors for investing in risk-
containing securities with a greater default probability than a treasury bond. An investor is 
one who “commits (money) in order to earn a financial return” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
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2014). As the level of the risk free rate may be different in different countries and changes 
depend on the relevant maturity, the spread is of greater interest than the absolute level of the 
interest rate (Nilsen, 2005). Bonds are often applied when companies need to borrow large 
amounts of money. Convertible loans are bonds that can be converted into stocks. The 
choice made depends on the market value of the stocks and the nominal amount of the bond 
(Berner, Mjøs, & Olving, 2013).  When one party pays another party for the right to use 
fixed assets for a specific time period, this is called leasing. This financing solution is 
applied in order to free up capital for other investments. 
It has not been mentioned, but some products mentioned as either long- or short-termed may 
also be medium-termed, depending on the needs of the company as well as on negotiation 
terms.  
All products mentioned above carry a cost, often referred to as an interest cost. The relative 
cost of long-term debt is often more expensive than short-term debt. The risk increases as the 
debtor has more time to default. The average interest cost in a company is a fusion of interest 
costs belonging to their respective liabilities, posted on the balance sheet. Some debt 
categories are considered non-interest-bearing, for example payables to suppliers. However, 
these suppliers know that they will not get paid until later and thus calculate an additional fee 
into the price of their products/services (Bergstrand, 2009). This additional fee is disregarded 
in the calculation of a company’s average interest rate as the amount is unknown. If a 
company defaults on a payment of interest costs, provision or principal, the creditor can 
demand a default interest, also called a penalty interest. In Norway, the government regulates 
the level of this interest rate through the “Late Payments Act”. The rate follows the Key 
Policy Rate adding at least eight per cent on top of it (The Financial Supervisory Authority 
of Norway, 2013).  
The size of the interest rate depends partly on the degree of risk aversion held by the 
creditor. The higher the risk, the higher the interest rate demands (Sættem, 2006). Risk is 
divided into several categories. One of them is credit risk, evaluated either by the creditor or 
an external agency. More information regarding credit risk follows in section 2.2 to 2.5. 
Short-term bank loans often have a fixed interest rate, whereas the interest rate on longer-
termed bank loans is often linked to a common benchmark (Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 
2012). This benchmark could, for example, be the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate, nibor. 
This rate is the money market rate in Norway and it is the interest rate that banks pay to 
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borrow money from each other. This affects the interest rate level that the banks can offer 
their customers. If the nibor is high, so will the interest rates they require from their 
customers most likely be.   
An interest cost is entered into a company’s income statement as an expense. Paying back 
principals, on the other hand, is not an expense, and reduces the total capital in the balance 
sheet (Sættem, 2006). The average interest rate applied in this specific report is further 
explained in section 3.5.1.   
2.2 The independent variable, the credit rating codes 
A credit rating is described by the European Union as “an opinion issued by a specialized 
firm on the creditworthiness of an entity (e.g. an issuer of bonds) or a debt instrument (e.g. 
bonds or asset-backed securities)” (European Commision, 2013). Credit ratings are futuristic 
and therefore subjective by nature (hence “opinion”). The quantification of the analysis 
contributes to make it more objective. As there are a vast and diverse number of factors 
involved in the credit ratings of various targets, all credit rating cannot be realized using one 
common method. This is underpinned in the sub-section regarding credit rating calculation. 
External credit ratings are welcomed by companies, as calculating them is very time-
consuming and requires specialized knowledge to perform (de Haan & Amtenbrink, 2011).  
2.2.1 Creditworthiness 
As the word creditworthiness indicates, it is about being “worthy of credit” or not. Being 
labeled “worthy of credit” sends a signal that an entity can be trusted to pay back the credit. 
This eases the entity’s access to capital and may also positively affect the size of the interest 
rate. The latter inference is the one under investigation in this paper. When trying to predict a 
company’s ability to handle its debts in the future, historical payment alone behavior is not 
sufficient to analyze a company’s creditworthiness. Creditworthiness is “a forward-looking 
concept, focusing on the probable incidence of credit difficulties in the future” (Fiedler, 
1971, s. 10). These “difficulties” can be represented by measures of the probability of 
default. The probability of default is a frequently used term depicting creditworthiness. 
When the probability decreases, it is more likely that the credit is paid back in full. The 
creditworthiness, represented by the calculation of probabilities of default, is presented to the 
public using credit rating codes.  
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2.2.2 A short timeline of credit rating 
In 1859 the first creditworthiness guide was published by Robert Dun. John Moody founded 
the first CRA 50 years later. In 1916, Fitch Ratings was founded and in 1941 Standard 
Statistics and Poor merged to become Standard & Poor’s (Langohr & Langohr, 2008). In 
1936, bank regulations in the United States began requiring banks only to invest in bonds 
receiving a rating above “investment grade” from at least two agencies (Adams, Mathieson, 
Schinasi, & Chadha, 1998). Having an investment grade means obtaining one of the best 
evaluations, further elaborated upon in section 2.4.1. This led to imbedding the CRAs’ work 
into the United State law, giving them increased power to influence the market (White, 
2007). From 1970 to 2001, the global financial system became market-based and the demand 
for CRAs increased (Langohr & Langohr, 2008). Today, however, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is reducing the overreliance on CRAs, 
scaling down the references to external CRAs in regulations (European Commision, 2013). 
This is also occurring in the European Union where banks are encouraged to use internal 
models when measuring risk. Issuers of structured finance instruments are also demanded to 
be more transparent regarding the underlying assets and issuers are required to engage two 
CRAs to rate structured finance instruments and to switch CRA every four years (European 
Commision, 2013).  
Even though criticized for undermining credit risk during the financial crisis, and the attempt 
to reduce the overreliance, the dependency on CRAs does not seem to be expiring any time 
soon. The demand for transparency, however, has increased.  
2.3 Credit rating players  
A credit rating may be official or unofficial. An official rating is publicly available, paid by 
the issuer
3
 and extended by one of the recognized CRAs (Alessi, Wolverson, & Sergie, 
2013). Unofficial rating codes can be created by any other player in the credit evaluation 
business.  
                                                 
3 The relevant issuer here is the issuer of the instrument, i.e. the debtor seeking credit. 
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The categories of credit information extenders are not undisputable competitors. They 
answer to different demands. Which agency a player should contact partly depends on the 
credit guidelines of the player. Perhaps there are demands regarding the application of 
certain CRAs. If international capital is required, and often when large amounts of capital are 
needed, the players turn to the large CRAs. As the service of the largest CRAs is very 
expensive, it also requires a certain size before a company can afford it and can receive the 
benefits from it. The country of origin of the counterparty also matters. Does the 
counterparty originate from the same country; a smaller national credit information extender 
may suffice.  
2.3.1 Credit Rating Agencies 
Moody’s Investors Service, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are called the big three 
CRAs. From now on, these are called Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, respectively. Together they 
have a market share of 95 per cent of the world market (European Commision, 2013). Even 
so, there are an additional seven Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 
NRSRO, in the United States (SEC, 2014 a). In the European Union, 24 CRAs are certified 
(ESMA, 2014). Lists can be found in the appendix as attachment 7.1 and 7.2. When referring 
to CRAs, the focus consistently remains on the big three.   
In 2011, Moody’s mostly rated issuers of government securities, constituting 81.5 per cent of 
their total rating activity. 9.4 per cent of the rating information was purchased by issuers of 
asset backed securities, 5.7 per cent by financial institutions, 3.0 per cent by corporate 
issuers and 0.4 per cent by insurance companies (White, 2013). These are defined as 
Moody’s customers. The typical bond holders, i.e. firms turning to CRAs for credit risk 
information, are thus not households, but institutions (White, 2013).  
Prior to the 1970s, investors paid CRAs to access information on issuers. Today, the issuer-
pays-model is predominant (Alessi, Wolverson, & Sergie, 2013), after S&P started the trend 
in 1974 (S&P a)
4
. Creditors rely on the CRAs’ analysis as it may be their main source of 
information regarding the level of risk in potential investments. This issuer-pays model has 
been exposed to critique, as it may lead to a conflict of interest. The issuer might “shop 
around” to search for the agency giving the highest rating code. For this reason, the 
                                                 
4 Again, the issuer refers to the debtor. 
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independency of CRAs might be questioned. However, White (2013) suggested two reasons 
for the change in the payer’s model from investor-paid to issuer-paid. The first one was the 
increasing possibility of photocopying of information. The second one was that it became 
clear, due to the increased use of CRAs in regulations, that their services were truly needed. 
An additional reason encouraging the model change was that the issuers’ threat of going 
elsewhere unless receiving a good rating code was not strong enough. A rating agency can 
namely issue an unsolicited rating code. This means that the agency does not receive any 
remuneration for it. The CRAs can thus indirectly threaten to issue a “bad” unsolicited rating 
unless paid for it. CRAs may also issue unsolicited ratings in order to cover a certain market 
or perhaps access a new market (Financial Times Lexicon). 
Sovereigns also seek to be rated by external CRAs in order to ease the access to global 
capital markets (Langohr & Langohr, 2008). For example, Norway’s long-term issuer default 
rating is top rated by all the big three (solicited by S&P and Moody’s), enabling Norway to 
access cheap capital on the international capital market.  
Furthermore, CRAs issue country ceilings. According to Fitch, country ceilings are not 
ratings, but expressions of the “maximum limit for the foreign currency issuer ratings of 
most, but not all, issuers in a given country” (Fitch).  
2.3.2 Business information providers 
Business information providers gather company data from many different sources and offer a 
vast amount of services based on this information. Sources may be various registers, such as 
the Register of Business Enterprises, the Register of Mortgaged Movable Property, the 
Register of Company Accounts as well as Debt Collection Agencies (Skarsvåg, 2005) and 
the companies themselves. The customers of business information providers have different 
needs and purchase different services. They can choose to access raw accounting data, 
unofficial rating information or purchase credit management solutions to integrate in their 
own internal systems.  
The largest suppliers of business information in Norway are Experian and Bisnode. Experian 
is the leading global information services company (Experian, 2014). It is listed on the 
London Stock Exchange and is present in 40 countries. One of their global business lines is 
credit services, analyzing credit risk assisted by their 13 credit bureaus (Experian a). Bisnode 
is present in 19 European countries (Bisnode). In Norway, Bisnode is divided into five 
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companies and one of them is Bisnode Dun & Bradstreet, distributing the rating codes 
applied later in this paper.  
In contrast to the issuer-pays model of CRAs, the investor-pays model is the predominant 
model when considering business information providers. According to the Discipline 
Manager in the credit department at Bisnode, Per Einar Ruud, there is one exception. 
Companies competing to win contracts pay for and submit their own credit rating codes 
(issuer-pays model). 
Business information providers are important players on the national market, especially for 
smaller institutions lacking the resources to rate customers themselves. Roughly speaking, 
all players issuing credit are potential customers of business information providers. In order 
to enable a quick response to credit risk changes of their debtor(s), the creditors need not 
only to check customers’ creditworthiness, but to monitor their behavior over time. 
Examples of customers are telecom companies, insurance companies, real estate companies 
and the retail sector. However, the largest demand derives from banks. They buy raw data 
and add this to their own data obtained directly from their customers before calculating 
internal rating codes. 
2.3.3 Banks  
Banks, insurance companies, finance companies and investment companies are able to 
analyze customers themselves as they are lending experts (White, 2013) and as the sources 
of information are easily accessible. The banks’ procedures are explicitly described below, 
as regulations require them to rate customers in a particular way.   
Banks are especially interested in credit rating codes not only because their core business is 
built on evaluating (potential) counterparty creditworthiness, but because regulators accept 
rating codes as elements of calculating the minimum capital requirement. Banks are heavily 
regulated in order to create trust in the market. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision is a global committee that “establishes minimum standards for the prudential 
regulation and supervision of banks” (BIS). The representatives are members of central 
banks and banking supervisions and are all voluntary members. The Basel Accords are 
agreed upon by the member states and have no legal force. Nevertheless, it is expected that 
they are implemented by the individual national authorities. The Basel Accords 
communicate how much regulatory capital a bank must have at all times in order to cover its 
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risks in a responsible manner. The Basel Committee’s recommendations are usually 
followed up by the European Union Directives and are also, due to the European Economic 
Area Agreement, implemented as Norwegian regulations (The Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway, 2010).  
The Basel accords are built on three pillars. Pillar one presents the minimum capital 
requirement (The Solvency Ratio) and how to calculate it. It must be at least eight per cent of 
risk weighted assets. The risk weights are based on the probability of default.  
The second pillar of the Basel Accord is the Internal Control and Supervisory Review. This 
pillar is about evaluating the appropriateness of the models applied in conjunction with pillar 
one. The evaluation process is called The Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process. 
Risks not taken into consideration through pillar one should be reviewed here, as well as the 
risk in conjunction with the impreciseness of the models (The Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway, 2009a).  
The third pillar is market discipline and has implications for disclosure requirements. 
Reports on models and the implementation of Basel II (the current version of the Basel 
Accords) must be produced and disclosed. This puts pressure on banks to enhance risk 
management procedures and enables external players to understand their rating procedures. 
Information regarding the calculation of credit rating codes in banks is found in section 2.5. 
Today, Basel III is increasing the capital requirement and, according to the Chief Financial 
Officer in Fana Sparebank, Kim Lingjærde, obliging banks to invest in a larger amount of 
covered bonds. A covered bond is “a bond which gives investors recourse to a specified pool 
of the issuer’s assets” (Bakke, Rakkestad, & Dahl, 2010, p. 4). In order to issue covered 
bonds, the issuer has to obtain an official rating code, making it even more favorable and 
necessary to be rated by one of the recognized CRAs (Bakke, Rakkestad, & Dahl, 2010).  
2.3.4 Export Credit Agencies  
An Export Credit Agency, ECA, is often a governmental institution. The goal of an ECA is 
to support its own country’s exports. The ECA in Norway is called the Guarantee Institute 
for Export Credits, GIEK, and is a public enterprise under the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Fisheries. GIEK guarantees government-backed loans given to international companies 
wanting to do business with Norwegian exporters (with a specific focus on developing 
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countries and emerging markets). Before setting the price for such a service, GIEK collects 
credit information from business information providers and performs credit assessments 
using a risk assessment model. The interest rate depends on risk, bank participation and the 
possibility of security (GIEK, 2013). The members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development have a gentlemen’s agreement expressing minimum interest 
rates, in order to reduce extreme price competition (OECD)
5
.  
2.3.5 Brokerage houses  
On the international bond market, the bond issuer needs to obtain an official rating code. On 
a national level, however, not all players obtain rating codes from the big three. Brokerage 
houses are then available to analyze the credit risk, issue unofficial rating codes and play the 
role as broker between a national bond issuer and potential national investor. Examples of 
such brokerage houses in Norway are DnB Markets and Nordea Markets. Through applying 
credit rating codes in their evaluations, they facilitate an efficient bond market, matching 
buyer and seller in terms of conditions. These players contribute with decisive information 
when the creditor is calculating the appropriate interest rate.  
2.3.6 Factoring companies 
Factoring companies are specialized firms acquiring the responsibility for other companies’ 
accounts receivables. Their customers are from now on called clients. The accounts 
receivables are bought by the factoring company for an amount below face value in 
exchange for a fee. Factoring includes checking the credit risk of the accounts receivables, 
i.e. the client’s customer’s creditworthiness. The providers of factoring services become 
experts on evaluating accounts receivables. Players engaging factoring companies are those 
needing to raise capital quickly, as the factoring company advances cash to pay for the 
receivables. Factoring may also be purchased by those that do not have the resources to 
handle their accounts receivables in a correct and timely manner themselves (Soufani, 2001).  
                                                 
5 This is simply an example of the application of credit ratings. The interest rate referred to is paid by foreign companies 
and is thus not a part of the average interest rate of the Norwegian companies involved in this study. 
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2.4 Credit rating calculation  
Exactly how a credit rating code is calculated is often a “company secret”. In the United 
States, The Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, oversees the NRSROs, but is not 
allowed to regulate their rating methodologies. However, through the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, disclosure requirements of credit 
rating methodologies and assumptions were introduced (SEC, 2014 b). This Act makes it 
easier to understand rating codes, without forcing CRAs to reveal their entire internal 
processes. The same development has been encountered in Europe through the European 
Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA, the regulator of CRAs in the European Union.   
A credit rating may be executed on a company, on an instrument or on a country. The focus 
in this thesis is on company ratings. A general credit rating analysis may look like the one 
presented in figure 2.1, starting to the left, continuing towards the right.  
 
Figure 2.1 Credit rating analysis  
Source: (Langohr & Langohr, 2008)   
                       
According to Langohr and Langohr (2008), a credit rating is based on an analysis of both 
business risk and financial risk. Business risk is influenced by company risk and industry 
risk. The financial risk is based on balance sheet analysis, profitability analysis, cash 
generation analysis and liquidity analysis. The factors within each risk receive a score. These 
are then weighed in order to arrive to the total score for business risk and financial risk, 
respectively. Country risk and soft factors such as management and aggressiveness of 
financial policies, can limit the overall credit score. A committee makes the final decision on 
the scoring and lastly, the score is transformed into a rating code. 
As mentioned in section 2.3, a rating code may be official or unofficial. The calculation of 
official rating codes is comprehensive as there are greater expectations to its accuracy. It will 
thus most likely include all factors illustrated in figure 2.1. Moody’s, for example, one of the 
largest CRAs in the world, employs a diverse group of credit risk professionals to manually 
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weigh the factors implemented in a credit rating code. Moody’s rating procedures are not 
based on a set of financial ratios already chosen prior to the analysis. Each target is 
individually analyzed based on individual needs. Moody’s explains that the focus is not put 
on balance sheet values, but on identifying the assets’ ability to generate and support future 
cash flow (Moody's). Figure 2.2 is an illustration of S&P’s credit rating analysis process, 
depicting a vast information base behind each rating.  
 
Figure 2.2 S&P’s risk factors for corporate ratings 
Source: (S&P, 2011) 
 
On the other side of the scale, calculating unofficial rating codes, smaller players are more 
likely to rate companies based on much less information. Some may, for example, not have 
the resources or the need to employ a credit committee to change ratings manually. 
2.4.1 Credit rating codes  
Credit ratings communicate a company’s creditworthiness to the market through credit rating 
codes. These codes are short, often only a number or a letter, quickly communicating the 
creditworthiness of an entity or an instrument. The applied code scheme may vary depending 
on the credit rater as well as the entity or item being rated. Remembering that the focus in 
this thesis is on company ratings, S&P uses the following scale for its long-term issuer credit 
rating (S&P b). 
- Country risk 
- Industry characteristics 
- Company position 
- Profitability, peer group  comparison 
- Accounting governance, risk 
tolerance, financial policy 
- Capital flow adequacy 
- Liquidity/short-term factors 
Business risk Financial risk 
Rating 
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AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, R, D/SD, NR   
From AA-ratings to CCC-ratings “+” and “-“ are applied to create nuances and to enable 
comparison within the major categories. An entity receiving an AAA-rating is said to be 
very capable of meeting financial commitments. R is given to entities under regulatory 
supervision and D-rated companies are expected to default and to fail to pay all obligations. 
SD stands for selected default and is assigned when a company defaults on selected 
obligations. NR is assigned to non-rated companies.  
Fitch (2014) applies almost the same scale. 
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, RD, D 
From AA-ratings to B-ratings “+” and “-“ are applied for the same reasons mentioned for 
S&P above. Fitch’s rating codes describe “an entity’s relative vulnerability to default on 
financial obligations” (Fitch, 2014). AAA stands for the lowest default risk and is only 
assigned to companies with exceptionally strong capacity to pay back on obligations. RD 
stands for restricted default, with a similar meaning as S&P’s SD. It is assigned when a 
company’s payments are overdue, but the company has not yet entered any bankruptcy 
filings. When given a D-rating, a company has ceased business and entered bankruptcy 
filings.      
Moody’s scale is built up like the following (Moody's, 2009).   
Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C, NR 
1, 2 and 3 are applied as modifiers to rating codes Aa to Caa to show further differences 
between companies. The ratings reflect the probability of default, where Aaa-rated 
companies are the ones with the lowest credit risk. NR stands for non-rated companies.  
From looking at the rating scales above it is obvious that the big three have copied each 
other to some extent. These letters are understood and recognized around the world as 
signals of credit risk. A common “language” for discussing credit risk has evolved, and so 
the scales stay quite similar. Bisnode, a smaller business information provider, uses AAA, 
AA, A, AN, B, C. Bisnode’s scale is elaborated upon in section 3.5.2. Experian uses a scale 
from 0 to 100 (Experian b). This scale is a joint European standard scale. Both limited and 
responsible companies as well as sole proprietorships are rated by Experian’s “expert 
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model”. The number of points are divided into groups, where the companies with the highest 
score have, according to Experian, the best creditworthiness. The scale looks like the 
following.  
1-14, 29-15, 30-49, 50-74, 75-100 
The codes are important for players evaluating credit risk as they communicate a vast 
amount of information quickly and in an aggregated manner. Investor regulations and 
guidelines are being constructed based on rating codes. A rating downgrade can have critical 
effects on a company when made public. Investors may, for example, decide to withdraw 
investments, sell out or demand a higher interest rate on extended credit. Due to the 
importance of avoiding a rating downgrade, monitoring services offered by credit evaluating 
bureaus are proven very popular. This gives the rated companies a chance to cooperate with 
the rating agency and to introduce necessary proactive changes to hinder a downgrade before 
execution.   
In the world of credit ratings, one may come across a rating code being referred to as 
“investment grade”. This indicates that the rating is of a high level and it has become a 
symbol of quality. Using the scale of the big three, it means that a rating code is BBB or 
higher for S&P and Fitch and Baa or above for Moody’s. This “threshold” is known to every 
player in the credit industry. A rating code below BBB/Baa is referred to as “junk”. Due to 
the increased risk taken by investing in “junk” companies, a higher return is also required. A 
rating code downgrade can have serious consequences for an entity, especially if the 
downgrade is from “investment grade” to “junk”. For example, portfolio manager 
performance may be benchmarked against credit rating codes and they might be obliged to 
withdraw investments if a downgrade turns an investment into “junk” (de Haan & 
Amtenbrink, 2011).   
Below, in figure 2.3, follows S&P’s credit rating code scheme, presented as an example of 
how each credit rating code is worded. The descriptions are verbatim quoted, followed by 
comments.   
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Figure 2.3 S&P’s long-term issuer credit rating codes 
Source: (S&P, 2013) 
 
Rating Description 
AAA An obligor rated 'AAA' has extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. 'AAA' is 
the highest issuer credit rating assigned by Standard & Poor's. 
AA An obligor rated 'AA' has very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. It differs from 
the highest-rated obligors only to a small degree. 
A An obligor rated 'A' has strong capacity to meet its financial commitments but is somewhat more 
susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than 
obligors in higher-rated categories. 
BBB An obligor rated 'BBB' has adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. However, adverse 
economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of 
the obligor to meet its financial commitments. 
BB An obligor rated 'BB' is less vulnerable in the near term than other lower-rated obligors. However, 
it faces major on-going uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic 
conditions which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. 
B An obligor rated 'B' is more vulnerable than the obligors rated 'BB', but the obligor currently has 
the capacity to meet its financial commitments. Adverse business, financial, or economic 
conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial 
commitments. 
CCC An obligor rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, 
and economic conditions to meet its financial commitments. 
CC An obligor rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable. The 'CC' rating is used when a default has not 
yet occurred, but Standard & Poor's expects default to be a virtual certainty, regardless of the 
anticipated time to default. 
R An obligor rated 'R' is under regulatory supervision owing to its financial condition. During the 
pendency of the regulatory supervision the regulators may have the power to favor one class of 
obligations over others or pay some obligations and not others. 
SD and D An obligor rated 'SD' (selective default) or 'D' is in default on one or more of its financial 
obligations including rated and unrated financial obligations but excluding hybrid instruments 
classified as regulatory capital or in non-payment according to terms. An obligor is considered in 
default unless Standard & Poor's believes that such payments will be made within five business 
days of the due date in the absence of a stated grace period, or within the earlier of the stated grace 
period or 30 calendar days. A 'D' rating is assigned when Standard & Poor's believes that the 
default will be a general default and that the obligor will fail to pay all or substantially all of its 
obligations as they come due. An 'SD' rating is assigned when Standard & Poor's believes that the 
obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations but it will continue to 
meet its payment obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely manner. An 
obligor's rating is lowered to 'D' or 'SD' if it is conducting a distressed exchange offer. 
NR An issuer designated 'NR' is not rated. 
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The description of all rating codes containing A is very positive and the wording “strong” 
capacity is applied. When the rating code is downgraded one notch, to BBB, the capacity to 
meet financial obligations is only “adequate”. The rating is, however, still “investment 
grade”. For BB-rated companies the chance of the capacity being “inadequate” is introduced. 
The step from adequate to potentially inadequate is a large one, and the weakened trust is 
signalized by specifying the company as “junk”. A company rated B currently has the 
necessary means available, but the capacity will quickly “impair” if conditions change. 
CCC-rated companies need “favorable conditions” to survive. This entails huge risks, 
requiring large returns to cover it. When rated CC, S&P expects the company to default and 
acquiring credit become will be hard.  
Many firms in need of access to market capital do as Statoil ASA, the largest firm in 
Norway, and purchase a solicited rating from one of the big three. Such a rating provides the 
access needed and may lead to favorable terms and conditions related to the capital, as trust 
towards a company increases with an official rating. Statoil ASA is rated Aa2 by Moody’s 
and AA- by S&P. Statoil ASA’s goal is to at least stay within the single-A category (Statoil 
ASA, 2013). Statkraft AS, another large Norwegian firm, is rated A- by S&P and Baa1 by 
Moody’s (Stenqvist, 2014).  
2.5 Credit rating calculation by banks   
Banks use credit rating codes as a financial decision making tool when evaluating (potential) 
customers. The method applied depends on the size of the bank and the resources available 
for risk calculation. Rating codes are also used for regulatory purposes. There are two main 
approaches to calculate the minimum requirement in a bank. There is the standard approach 
and the internal ratings-based approach, where the former applies external credit rating codes 
and the latter and more advanced method requires banks to internally calculate credit rating 
codes.  
Credit rating codes used for internal customer credit assessments 
There are many factors involved in a customer evaluation. Some examples on an aggregated 
level may make it easier to understand. The calculation of credit risk in Fana Sparebank in 
Norway depends on three decisive factors. These are payment capacity, security and 
payment willingness. The former refers to accounting information and the latter refers to 
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“other business risks” (Fana Sparebank, 2012). Each parameter is given a risk class between 
A and E, where A is the best. Thereafter, the risk classes are weighed.  Payment capacity is 
weighed 0.5, security 0.3 and payment willingness 0.2. Next, they are united as one risk 
class. The key indicators applied in the evaluation are received from Kim Lingjærde and 
listed below.  
- Payment defaults 
- Audit remarks 
- Liquidity ratio 
- Working capital in per cent of turnover 
- Equity in per cent of total capital as well as compared to the industry average 
- Profit margin compared to the industry average 
- Interest-bearing debt in per cent of EBIDTA 
- The age of the company  
- The number of employees.  
 
In addition to these indicators, banks include security in their ratings. Security can be 
interpreted as a “second way out” when measuring the risk of issuing credit (Flakke, 2010). 
As an extra safety is obtained without having to reduce the initial claim on the borrower, 
banks reduce their net risk. Security is a way of mitigating the information asymmetry 
problem between borrower and lender (Gonzales & Ozuna, 2012).  
After the parameters are weighed, the final credit rating code of the corporate commitment is 
ultimately matched with a risk description. Risk is described as minimal for class A, small 
for B, medium for C, high for D and highest for E (Fana Sparebank, 2012). 
Sparebanken Vest, a larger Norwegian bank, calculates its rating codes differently. Its 
ratings are based on internal calculations of probabilities of default. Their scorecard has 11 
risk classes, A to K, all representing decision zones. The risk classes and the accompanying 
probabilities of default in percentages are documented in figure 2.4.  
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Risk class Lower limit, 
probability of default (%) 
Upper limit, 
probability of default (%) 
A  0.00 0.10 
B  0.10 0.25 
C  0.25 0.50 
D  0.50 0.90 
E  0.90 1.50 
F  1.50 2.75 
G 2.75 5.00 
H 5.00 10.00 
I   10.00 25.00 
J  25.00 100.00 
K 100.00 100.00 
Figure 2.4 Risk classes based on the probability of default 
Source: (Sparebanken Vest, 2013)  
 
The probability that a company assigned to risk class A defaults is only between zero and 0.1 
per cent. As the risk class worsens, the probability of default slightly increases. Not until risk 
class H does a company have more than a five per cent probability of default.  
The detected risk class is the groundwork when entering a more thorough analysis of the 
customer’s earnings potential, downside potential and behavior. Next, the customers’ 
security is evaluated, using the expected value in a realization situation. Mortgages in real 
estate are considered risk-reducing. Thereafter follows the decision regarding credit issuance 
and risk price. This multi-step approach shows that, even though two customers receive the 
same risk score (same probability of default), they can still be treated differently due to 
different security. 
The relative probability of default, PD, together with the calculation of the relative loss given 
default, LGD, and the bank’s exposure at default, EAD, allows the calculation of the 
expected loss, EL, which is then covered by incorporating it in the pricing of instruments 
(e.g. increasing the interest rate) as well as by putting aside provisions. Equation 2.1 and 
equation 2.2 show the calculation. 
EL (relative number) = PD * LGD Equation 2.1 
When multiplying the relative expected loss with the bank’s exposure at default, EAD, the 
expected loss in an absolute number is uncovered. 
EL (absolute number) = (PD * LGD) * EAD Equation 2.2 
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Credit rating codes used to calculate the minimal capital requirement 
All banks in Norway except for DnB Nor Bank, Nordea Bank Norge, Sparebanken Vest, 
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank, SpareBank 1 SMN, SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge and Bank 1 Oslo are 
standard approach banks (Andersen, 2011). When using a standard approach for calculating 
the minimum capital requirement, the risk is reflected using external rating codes from one 
of the External Credit Assessment Institutions, as their own internal credit risk models are 
not considered sufficiently advanced. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
allows rating codes from S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and Dominion Bond Rating Service to be 
used to stipulate risk weights for commitments where this has been made permissible (The 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2009b). The various rating codes are then 
converted into S&P’s rating scale and transformed into risk-weights. This applies to 
unstructured exposures. Figure 2.5 comprises risk weights in percentages (Kjelsrud & 
Andersen, 2007). In Basel I, from 1988, the risk weights were only stipulated based on the 
type of item being rated (sovereign, corporate, real estate etc.), but Basel II allows external 
credit rating codes to be included as well, increasing the quality of the calculation.  
Risk Class S&P Moody’s Fitch Risk weights,  
states and central 
banks (%) 
Risk weights,  
enterprises 
(%) 
1 AAA to AA- Aaa to Aa3 AAA to AA- 0  20  
2 A+ to A- A1 to A3 A+ to A- 20 50    
3 BBB+ to BBB- Baa1 to Baa3 BBB+ to BBB- 50 100  
4 BB+ to BB- Ba1 to Ba3 BB+ to BB- 100 100  
5 B+ to B- B1 to B3 B+ to B- 100 150  
6 CCC+ and  
lower 
Caa1 and 
lower 
CCC+ and  
lower 
150 150  
Figure 2.5 From rating categories to rating classes, long-term rating           
Source: (Balthazar, 2006) 
 
The far left column shows the risk classes and the next three depict the corresponding rating 
codes of the big three. The two columns to the right list the risk weights. The use of risk 
weights depend on whether the entity in focus is an enterprise (far right column), or a 
sovereign or central bank (second right column).  
When using an internal ratings-based approach, the requirement is not based on the opinion 
of external CRAs, but on internal models with internal risk parameters. Implementing an 
internal ratings-based approach is quite resource demanding, and only implemented by banks 
that consider the benefits larger than the cost. The required capital in an internal ratings-
based approach reflects the actual risk more accurately and is much lower compared to using 
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a standard approach. Banks applying the internal approach may thus free up capital to 
employ alternatively. The standard approach is created to be applied by different banks 
despite varying risk profiles. This leads to the calculation of higher requirements.  
The minimum capital requirement towards Norwegian banks is steadily increasing, reducing 
the access to capital. According to the Norwegian Central Bank governor Øystein Olsen 
(2013), one way the banks are reaching their target is by increasing their lending margins 
through increased interest rates. A bank may also reduce its amount of credit extended in 
order to reduce the capital requirement. This reduces the price competition, also leading to 
higher lending margins (Langberg, 2014), i.e. increasing the dependent variable in this 
thesis. 
2.6 Potential control variables 
In this thesis, the changes in the interest rate is sought to be explained by the credit rating 
codes. The theoretical framework regarding these two variables has been presented above. 
Despite consisting of a great deal of aggregated data, credit rating codes most likely do not 
explain the changes in a company’s interest rate all by themselves. Thus, other explanations 
need to be considered. These “other” explanations take the form of control variables 
(Midtbø, 2012).  
To choose the appropriate control variables, an understanding of the components of the 
interest rate is necessary. As can be seen in table 3.1 and table 3.2, the debt to financial 
institutions is the largest category of credit and thus assumed to be the most influential part 
of the relevant debt, leading to a focused search on the price of this type of debt.  
Characteristics influencing the price of debt to financial institutions may be firm specific as 
well as industry specific characteristics. When analyzing the relationship between the 
interest rate and lending relationships, Petersen and Rajan (1994) proved that size, 
represented by the natural logarithm of the book value of assets, significantly influences the 
interest rate on a company’s most recent loan. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) used size to 
analyze post-entry performance of new firms. They found firm size, when represented as the 
number of employees, being positively related to the probability of survival. Fana Sparebank 
also considers the number of employees as an important factor when evaluating a customer’s 
creditworthiness.  
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The Norwegian Bank’s SEBRA-model is a credit evaluation model, analyzing banks’ credit 
risk towards the business sector (Eklund, Larsen, & Bernhardsen, 2001). In addition to 
accounting information representing earning capacity, liquidity and solidity, a company’s 
risk of defaulting falls on the analysis of accounting numbers compared to industry averages 
as well as the age and size of a company. The ratios compared to the industry averages are 
the equity ratio, supplier debt ratio and the standard deviation of the earnings ratio. The 
denominator is always total capital.  
The age is implemented by the SEBRA-model as the number of years since incorporation. 
The results show that younger companies default more often. The same is concluded by 
Svendsen (2005) in his article regarding characteristics of bankruptcy. Causes identified by 
Eklund, Larsen and Bernhardsen (2001), are, that new companies do not have the same 
competency, access to capital or ability to establish profitable business relationships as more 
mature institutions have. When adding size to the analysis, the SEBRA-model chooses the 
sum of assets. The results showed that the next youngest companies default the most. One 
reason may be that the youngest companies do not have enough bankruptcy estate to make a 
bankruptcy filing sensible (Eklund, Larsen, & Bernhardsen, 2001).  
Fana Sparebank also uses accounting information when evaluating customers’ credit risk, 
assisting the bank in the pricing of loans (Fana Sparebank, 2012). However, accounting 
information only accounts for 50 per cent of the foundation when calculating a customer’s 
risk class. Furthermore, Fana Sparebank evaluates payment defaults and audit remarks. 
Information in their annual report regarding credit evaluation components is scarce, but it is 
natural to assume that an increasing number of payment defaults and audit remarks lead to a 
more negative credit evaluation and thus higher interest rates. Age is also considered by 
Fana Sparebank. 
Credit may also be extended based on various covenants. A covenant is an “undertaking 
given by a borrower to its lender to maintain a minimum or maximum level of a financial 
measure such as gearing or net worth or interest cover” (Moir & Sudarsanam, 2007, p. 151). 
Strict covenants may reduce the level of the required interest rate. Covenants are more often 
applied to long-term debt (Moir & Sudarsanam, 2007), which may contribute to weaken the 
assumption of the long-term debt having a higher interest rate.  
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Security is also mentioned as influencing the price of money. The same applies to security. 
A credit extender can take security in, for example, the borrower’s real estate. If the 
borrower defaults on his payments, the credit extender may sell the real estate to cover his 
losses. The more security a borrower can offer, the lower the interest rate may potentially 
become. Banks with internal credit evaluation methods often have information on a debtor’s 
security opportunities. An example is Fana Sparebank, weighing security 30 per cent in their 
internal credit rating model.  
Edward I. Altman developed a bankruptcy model called the Z-score model (Altman, 1968). 
The original model includes five parameters, describing the chances of a company going 
bankrupt or not. Most of Altman’s ratios are based on accounting data, representing 
liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency and activity ratios (Altman, 1968).  
Considering a company’s main banking relationship would be of interest in order to detect 
potential differences in the level of interest rates offered by various banks. Macroeconomic 
characteristics may also influence the interest rate. They influence the supply and demand of 
credit and include parameters such as changes in income and inflation (Levy & Bar-Niv, 
1987), as well as the money market rate. Levy and Bar-Niv (1987) found that increased 
variations in income and an increase in inflation lead to an increased probability of company 
default. It is also expected that the interest rate increases as the nibor increases.  
2.7 The hypothesis, elaborated upon  
The hypothesis behind the research question is, as mentioned, that there is a statistically 
significant and inverse relationship between creditworthiness and the interest rate. Now that 
the theoretical framework has been presented, this hypothesis and its underlying assumptions 
can shortly be elaborated upon.   
Firstly, why would there be a relationship between the average interest rate of a company 
and credit rating codes? Their common factor is credit risk. The codes are built on perceived 
levels of credit risk and so are the interest rates assumed to be, regardless of whether the 
credit risk evaluation was executed internally or externally.  
Secondly, why would the relationship be of an inverse nature? As creditworthiness increases, 
the interest rate is assumed to decrease. Increased creditworthiness implies that the credit 
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rating code assigned becomes more favorable. In other words, the credit rating code is 
moving in the direction of AAA. If a company is able to achieve a more favorable credit 
evaluation, this is expected to be reflected in the cost of debt. The reason for this expectation 
is that risk aversion is assumed to be fundamental in the average Norwegian mind-set. The 
association is thus; the higher the credit risk, the higher the probability of default, the lower
6
 
the credit rating code assigned, and the higher the relative interest cost.  
Thirdly, why should the inverse relationship be statistically significant? The interest rate 
differences should be large enough to rule out arbitrary differences. This helps to establish 
that the detected differences truly are a result of the credit rating codes and it also minimizes 
the risk of false conclusions.  
A broad angle was applied when reviewing the theoretical framework on the topics of this 
thesis. The focus now narrows down on the variables relevant for this report’s analysis. 
Information regarding the data set follows, centering on the selection process leading to the 
formation of the sample, which all further analysis is based upon.  
 
                                                 
6 A “lower” code means a less favorable code.  
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3. Data 
The data set is the core of this thesis, enabling the investigation of the research question. The 
data, the selected sample and the methods applied in the statistical analysis are elaborated 
upon.     
3.1 Introduction to the data  
A data set with company information is applied to support the investigation of this paper’s 
research question: does increased creditworthiness lead to reduced interest rate?.  
The data has been delivered yearly to the SNF and NHH by The Brønnøysund Register 
Centre via Bisnode D&B Norway and Menon Business Economics AS (Berner, Mjøs, & 
Olving, 2013).  
All Norwegian public and private companies from 1992 to 2011 are covered by the data set. 
In total, there are 3 179 684 company observations and 101 010 group company observations 
(Berner, Mjøs, & Olving, 2013), organized as yearly panel data. The data set includes 
quantitative accounting information as well as qualitative facts. The former is found in the 
income statements, balance sheets and self-generated variables. The qualitative facts cover 
company facts and industry facts.  
The income statement shows an overview of the income and expenses of a company, 
including the interest cost relevant in this thesis. The balance sheet portrays the assets a 
company owns and how they are financed. Examples of the self-generated variables are 
interest-bearing debt, the equity ratio, the tax rate and earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The former is applied in the generating of the 
dependent variable, the interest rate. The accounts consist of singular posts as well as 
summation posts. All numbers are plotted in thousands, which they continue to be in this 
thesis. 
Some of the company facts are company names, addresses, legal forms, year of 
incorporation, credit rating codes and the number of women on the board of directives. The 
industry facts include the main, secondary and third industry code as well as industry 
descriptions.  
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Both the accounting data and the facts have had to undergo extensive processing in order to 
be of use to the collectors. Processing and quality controls of the information in the data set 
are conducted and published in a public document. This document is called “Working Paper 
18/2013 Norwegian Corporate Accounts - Documentation and quality assurance of SNF’s 
and NHH’s database of accounting and company information for Norwegian companies”7. 
The data base has been developed in order to create a basis for research executed by SNF 
and NHH members, both researchers and students. The purpose of the working document is 
to inform the users of the opportunities and limitations of the data. It has been of great help 
when writing this thesis.  
In addition to the quantitative data set, interviews were performed in order fill in the gaps 
where needed. Direct contact was made with Bisnode, obtaining more detailed information 
than available in the working paper and on Bisnode’s web pages. This was done as the credit 
rating codes play an important role in the thesis as the explanatory variable. January 29
th
, an 
hour long telephone conversation with the Discipline Manager in the credit department of 
Bisnode, Per Einar Ruud, was executed. This initiated further contact, consisting of short e-
mail dialogues occurring from February through March. The questions were of a direct 
nature, leading to the detection of various key indicators built into their credit default model.  
February 14
th
, a two hour long meeting was conducted with the Head of Finance at Fana 
Sparebank, Kim Lingjærde. The purpose was to acquire knowledge on the bank’s credit 
rating procedures. The topics mostly regarded the minimum capital requirement, the bank’s 
credit risk and the upcoming Basel III guidelines. Rating codes made public by banks are not 
a large part of the thesis, nevertheless, it contributed to the theoretical framework. Also here, 
subsequent e-mail contact was held.  
March 25
th
, e-mail contact was initiated with Steinar Carlsen, Chief Executive Officer, CEO, 
of Hard Rocx AS. This was the company with the largest interest rate value. Carlsen was 
presented with the interest rate calculation and was asked to contribute with information to 
clarify the extremeness of their interest rate value.  
                                                 
7 The Norwegian version was applied. The Norwegian translation of this document name is found in the bibliography. 
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3.2 Processing 
Between 1992 and 2011, several accounting standard changes occurred, influencing 
company data. The largest change was implemented in 2005 when the European Union 
decided that companies listed on the stock exchange had to prepare group company accounts 
based on International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS. This accounting standard is 
more balance oriented than the Norwegian income statement focus.  
After receiving the data, representatives of SNF and NHH started processing it in order to 
make it user friendly. The latest “update” was made available in 2013 by Endre Berner, 
Aksel Mjøs and Marius Olving. As a new accounting law was issued in 1998, the procedure 
of reviewing the data was split into two parts. Data from 1992 to 1998 and from 1999 to 
2011 were processed separately.  
The data has been labeled according to the Norwegian accounting law of 1998 in order to 
increase consistency and standardization. However, as different companies implement 
accounting standards at different times, complete consistency over time and between 
companies is not considered realistic. Details on the processing of the data in view of the 
accounting standard changes have not been documented in the working document as the 
work was too extensive.  
When the information available from the data base was too scarce, the SNF and NHH 
representatives extracted details from annual reports’ notes. In addition, information was 
extracted from the following sources 
- Industry information from Statistics Norway 
- Default information, accounting standards, auditors, accountant and structure of the 
boards from The Brønnøysund Register Centre 
- Information regarding listed companies from Børsprosjektet  (NHH’s data base for 
companies listed on the Norwegian stock exchange) 
- Laws regarding the statement of accounts from The Norwegian Accounting Act  
- Nibor from the Norwegian Central Bank. 
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3.3 Quality check  
In order to evaluate the effects of the changes in the Accounting Act of 1998 and the 
transition to IFRS in 2005, several company accounts were checked for deviations between 
information in the data base and the annual reports. This enabled the discovery of input 
errors as well as the opportunity to generate new variables where large changes were 
detected.  
Most missing variables were detected in residual posts. As accounting information was 
copied directly into the dataset, the summations were, nevertheless, considered correct. 
Missing variables mostly belonged to the time period 1992 to 1998, and new variables were 
generated. There is thus some uncertainty around the content of these generated variables. 
An overview of the detection of missing variables is presented in the working document. For 
each year it shows if data are missing or if there are simply few recorded observations.  
On the one hand, it is stated that the sample used to verify mistakes is too small to conclude 
the data base’s error rate. On the other hand, no sign of systematic deviations was detected; 
accordingly, the significance of the mistakes is considered small.   
Without any further changes, the typical company looked like the one in figure 3.1, averaged 
over all years. The numbers are in thousands.  
Income statement 
 
The result of the year 
 
1733.13 
 
Balance sheet
8
 
Current asses 34 927.56 16 763.43 Equity 
Fixed assets 29 522.77 31 405.12 Short-term debt 
  16 281.93 Long-term debt 
Sum 64 450.33 64 450.48  
 
Figure 3.1 The average company in the data set, prior to changes 
The results after the trimming of the data set can be seen in figure 3.2. 
3.4 Selection of relevant data – creating the sample 
In order to serve the purpose of answering the research question in this thesis, a sample of 
the population was chosen based on several criteria. Firstly, a short overview of the criteria 
                                                 
8 With rounding errors. 
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is presented. Thereafter, more detailed information explaining the reasons behind the choices 
follows. 
Observations with the following characteristics were excluded from the data set
9
. 
- No credit rating (1) 
- No/negative interest rate (2) 
- Inactive/bankrupt/terminated/ companies (3) 
- Group associated companies (4) 
- All company structures except for limited liability companies, as well as publicly 
owned companies (5) 
- Companies within the “Finance and Insurance” or “R&D” industry (6) 
- Other missing data (7) 
- Obvious input errors (8) 
 
1) Available credit rating codes for all observations 
The credit rating code is the independent variable and thus needs to be represented in the 
sample. The only years for which rating codes are available are from 2005 to 2011. The 
years 1992 to 2004 are thus excluded. In addition, all companies that have not received a 
rating code at all are excluded.  
2) All companies have positive interest rates 
The interest rate is the dependent variable and this report concerns companies that are 
indebted and that pay interest costs. Observations with negative or zero interest rates are thus 
excluded. In effect, this removes companies with negative or zero in interest costs and 
interest-bearing debt.  
3) All companies are active players on the market 
In this thesis, healthy companies able to act out their core activities and at least reach some 
positive sales income are target companies. For this reason, companies labeled inactive as 
well as companies labeled bankrupt or terminated, are excluded. Companies registered with 
a year of bankruptcy are also excluded, despite the fact that some of them have survived 
after the filing. Companies with fundamental posts such as sum of current or non-current 
                                                 
9 The numbers link the characteristics to further explanations below. 
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assets or sum of short-term or long-term debt below zero, are excluded. The same goes for 
companies with no positive sales income or equity. This is done in order to exclude 
companies that are labeled active, but that still do not perform any business. The analyses 
thus involve companies providing enough information for Bisnode to make sound credit 
ratings
10
.  
4) No companies are affiliated 
Group-credit ratings may affect the interest rate of the subsidiaries as the group can vouch 
for the payment capacity of the subsidiary. The activities of the subsidiaries may also 
influence the credit rating of the parent companies. They are thus both, together with 
affiliated companies, excluded from the sample.  
5) All companies are of the type private limited liability company  
Companies that are not limited liability companies are excluded. When choosing one group 
to focus on, the conclusions drawn can better explain the behavior of this specific group. All 
limited liability companies are assumed to be profit maximizing. The same cannot be said 
about partnerships, sole proprietorships, public companies or observations where the 
company category is not clearly defined. These are thus excluded. Within the chosen 
category there are limited companies (AS/BA), publicly limited companies (ASA) and 
Norwegian-registered foreign enterprises (NUF) and these are assumed to share similar 
behavior patterns. Companies with public “ownership structure” above 50 per cent were 
excluded.  
6) Certain industries are excluded  
The industries “finance and insurance” and “research and development” are excluded as the 
characteristics of their assets are often very different from any other industry’s assets. This 
refers particularly to the non-physical substance of the assets.  
  
                                                 
10 Note that assets and debt are allowed to be zero (as long as interest-bearing debt is above zero, which it is), but sales 
income and equity have to be positive (because zero in these two variables means no activity).   
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7) All observations with missing posts are excluded 
After the selections above were executed, a missing values-table was generated. If an 
observation (a company) had a missing value in one of the variables applied in the analysis, 
the entire observation was removed from the sample
11
.  
8) Obvious input errors are altered 
Some observations had a year of incorporation equal to 1.99, 2.00 and 2.01. Assumptions 
were made and these values were altered to 1999, 2000 and 2001, respectively.  
After executing the selections above, the sample fit the purpose of this report better. To 
finalize the processing of the data, a closer look at influential values was deemed necessary.   
3.4.1 Influential values 
Regression analysis is the chosen tool for the statistical analysis of the data and variables 
with very large values can influence the regression coefficients severely (Watson & Stock, 
2012). This may lead to large model residuals (the difference between observed and 
predicted values). According to Midtbø (2012), various influential values may have reduced 
credibility and should be examined. Some large balance sheet summation posts in the data 
set were compared against relevant annual reports and proven true (i.e. they were not input 
errors). Regardless, their deviation from the mean value was too large and thus not 
welcomed as a part of the sample.  
There are several solutions to reducing the impact of influential values. They can be 
removed or their impact can be reduced. When reducing their impact, winsorizing is possible 
(Ghosh & Vogt, 2012). Winsorizing can be performed using different “cut-off”-points. 
When winsorizing at the 95 percentile, five per cent of the highest and the lowest 
observations are not removed, but given the same values as the values at the cut-off points. 
The observations are thus not deleted entirely, but the influential power of their values is 
reduced. An advantage is that none of the data are removed. It does however give a wrong 
impression of the frequency of values. They also still influence the results considerably. 
Imagine an interest rate being one per cent, but entered incorrectly as 100 per cent. It would 
then be considered better to remove it, than keeping it at a cut-off rate at, say, 50 per cent.  
                                                 
11 An exception is the liquidity ratio compared with 74 permissible missing values, more information in section 4.1.2. 
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When eliminating variables entirely, specific values may be identified and excluded, or cut-
off points may be applied.  
In this thesis, the largest interest rate value observed was 8 356 per cent. The company’s 
average interest-bearing debt was NOK 9 000 and their interest costs were NOK 376 000 
(376 000 / 9 000 = 8 356 per cent). In this case, it is obvious that the correlation between the 
numerator and the denominator is not a healthy one and contact was made with the 
company’s CEO, Steinar Carlsen, to increase the understanding of the results. This company 
has large overdraft facilities (credit lines) between January and August each year and pays 
back the amount within August. The debt is thus not visible in their balance sheets and the 
interest rate calculated in this thesis becomes unrealistically large. This is just one of many 
possible reasons for the large interest rate values in the data set. As the rates were generated 
by the author of this thesis, they do not always coincide with the true values. More 
information on this follows in section 3.5.1 and 3.8. In order to remove the largest and 
probably untrue interest rates, all interest rates above the 95 percentile limit were removed.  
Not only the generated interest rate, but also most other variables, had extremely right 
skewed distributions. This means containing extremely positive values leading to a 
distribution with a right tail. The same trimming process was thus also performed on the 
following list of variables.  
- Sum of current assets 
- Sum of non-current assets 
- Sum of short-term debt 
- Sum of long-term debt 
- Equity 
As the analyses were executed yearly, so was the trimming.  
Succeeding all changes, the typical company looked like the one in figure 3.2, averaged over 
all years.   
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Income statement 
 
The result of the year 
 
154.63 
 
Balance sheet
12
 
Current asses 1425.72 692.25 Equity 
Fixed assets 1032.54 903.94 Short-term debt 
  862.08 Long-term debt 
Sum 2458.26 2458.27  
 
Figure 3.2 The average company in the sample, post changes 
The sum of assets is only 3.814 per cent of what it was in the original data set, reducing the 
spread of the values of the companies and leading to a sample dominated by smaller 
companies.   
3.5 Selection of relevant variables 
After the process of selecting functional and appropriate data for the study, the dependent  
and independent variables along with the control variables are now presented.  
3.5.1 The dependent variable, the interest rate 
The interest rate has, as mentioned, been generated by the author of this thesis. The interest 
cost was divided by the interest-bearing debt. The question is; which parameters are the best 
to represent the relevant interest cost and the relevant debt in the best possible way? 
In the income statements there are two interest cost posts.  Interest cost within the group and 
interest cost. Only the latter is included, as group companies and subsidiaries are not a part 
of this analysis. The interest cost post also includes other interest costs. Any further 
specification is not available. This limits the depth of analysis and is important to keep in 
mind when interpreting the results. The aggregated post financial costs is not applied as it 
includes impairments, other financial costs and losses due to currency exchange. These posts 
are not a part of the relevant analysis.  
Regarding the relevant debt, the SNF and NHH have already derived two total interest-
bearing debt parameters through employing the accounting numbers. These are total 
interest-bearing debt maximum and total interest-bearing debt minimum. The former is 
calculated by adding all debt and subtracting non-interest-bearing debt. The latter is 
calculated by adding all debt that is guaranteed to be interest-bearing (Berner, Mjøs, & 
                                                 
12 With rounding errors. 
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Olving, 2013). Despite the fact that these are simplified measures and may not be the true 
interest-bearing debt, they represent the best possible measures. The maximum and 
minimum calculations are very similar, and the choice of variable does thus not affect the 
analysis in a significant way. In this thesis, the minimum debt calculation has been chosen. 
The average of the opening and closing balance is applied. Below follows the interest rate 
calculation.   
                         
 
               
                                          13
 
(3.1) 
When generating relative variables, it is important to consider the match between the 
numerator and the denominator. Total interest-bearing debt minimum includes short-term 
group debt and long-term group debt. Group information should not be a part of our data set. 
The parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliated companies are, however, already excluded. 
Group information is thus neither to be found in the numerator nor the denominator. It 
should be mentioned, that the match between the interest costs paid and the interest-bearing 
debt is still not guaranteed.  
The interest-bearing debt, upon which the interest rate in this paper is based, is an aggregated 
post containing the following long-term posts. 
- Long-term convertible loans  
- Bonds loans  
- Long-term liabilities to financial institutions  
- Subordinated loan capital  
- Unspecified long-term financial debt  
 
The short-term posts follow. 
- Short-term convertible loans  
- Short-term market financing 
- Short-term liabilities to financial institutions  
                                                 
13 OB = Opening balance and EB = Ending balance.  
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In order to try to understand what determines the size of the interest rate, the size of each of 
the abovementioned interest-bearing debts are displayed in table 3.1 and table 3.2. 
Table 3.1 Long-term interest-bearing debt categories, amount per year 
 Accounting year Long-term debt    
 Convertible 
loans 
Bond 
loans 
Financial 
institutions 
Subordinated 
loan 
Unspecified 
financial 
debt 
2005 2.153 3.305 484.352 3.953 255.369 
2006 1.953 3.694 530.621 4.099 265.695 
2007 2.691 4.412 568.815 0.763 244.830 
2008 2.645 6.006 620.405 1.255 239.552 
2009 2.694 5.715 610.594 2.547 209.418 
2010 2.654 4.886 627.846 2.964 226.993 
2011 3.696 5.867 648.394 3.287 220.923 
Average 2.648 4.839 584.379 2.728 236.908 
 
Table 3.2 Short-term interest-bearing debt categories, amount per year 
 Accounting year Short-term debt 
 Convertible 
loans 
Certificates Financial  
institutions 
2005 1.177 0.416 70.662 
2006 1.624 0.760 74.560 
2007 2.691 0.637 72.555 
2008 2.645 0.706 75.349 
2009 2.694 0.587 66.674 
2010 2.654 0.598 67.424 
2011 3.696 1.020 71.370 
Average 2.456 0.672 71.058 
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Clearly, the long-term and short-term liabilities to financial institutions and unspecified long-
term financial debt are the most influential factors. The unspecified debt is unfortunately not 
a good basis for interpretation.  Mostly, long-term liabilities are promissory notes, mortgages 
and construction loans, whereas the short-term liabilities are time-limited loans, time limited 
loans in foreign currency and lines of credit given by banks.  
Naturally, the calculation of the interest rates on the various liabilities vary, but due to the 
domination of the liabilities to financial institutions, it is normal to assume that interest rates 
set by banks etc. play a large role in the estimation of the average interest rate per company.  
3.5.2 The independent variable, the credit rating codes 
The credit rating codes are calculated by the business information provider Bisnode Dun & 
Bradstreet.  The rating system is called the AAA-rating system, or the expert model and is 
designed to rate Norwegian companies. According to Per Einar Ruud in Bisnode, this system 
is created in order to calculate a company’s probability of default. Both financial and non-
financial parameters are added into the model. The calculations are mechanically performed.  
Companies can buy access to the rating codes calculated by Bisnode, or the system can be 
purchased and integrated into internal credit assessment models. The system is updated 
whenever new information is available, thus always being up-to-date. The credit assessment 
is based on four pillars (Bisnode Norway). Additional information below each pillar is added 
where appropriate, based on information received from Per Einar Ruud. 
- Basic facts about the company 
o Age- two years defines established companies and five years and above 
defines well-established companies (from the year it was registered in the 
register for business enterprises) 
- Information on the owner and judicial aspects  
o Mostly applied to newly established limited companies without accounts. 
Private information regarding the chairman and the CEO, is examined.  
o Ownership structure 
o Company structure 
- Key indicators and economic aspects 
o Key indicators 
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 Profitability,  interest coverage, return on assets and changes in return 
on assets 
 Liquidity, long-term financing of stock, working capital and liquidity 
ratios 1 and 2 
 Financing, loss buffer, equity ratio and share capital 
o Economic aspects 
 Audit remarks 
- Payment history 
o Payment defaults from collection agencies and public registers. The amount 
due, maturity of the debt and the type of default as well as the total amount 
against the equity is considered.  
 
Following each topic are decision trees with approximately 2500 rules (Bisnode Norway). 
Additional requirements for top rating codes are the following. In order to receive an AAA 
or AA, the company’s turnover has to be at least NOK 1 000 000 or NOK 500 000 
respectively and the equity has to be more than NOK 200 000 or 100 000 respectively 
(Bisnode Norway). Ruud specified that adding industry information as well as analyzing key 
indicators up against industry averages are improvement opportunities to make the codes 
more accurate. Bisnode’s credit rating code scheme is presented in figure 3.3. 
Rating Description 
AAA This entity has a strong economy, is well established and has no registered payment remarks of 
importance or audit remarks. Sole proprietorships cannot achieve an AAA-rating. 
AA The characteristic of an AA-rated company is a well-established company with a good or 
satisfactory economy. There is no significant negative information registered on the entity. 
A An A-rated entity usually has a somewhat weak economy, but can still be considered as a 
creditworthy entity. No or insignificant negative information is registered on the entity. 
B A B-rated entity has a weak or bad economy. It has been operating at a loss and the equity is 
partially or completely lost. There is no negative information in terms of payment defaults 
registered on the entity.  
C This entity has a weak or bad economy and there is severe payment remarks registered. It can also 
be a newly established entity without accountings, but for which negative information is registered 
on the company, the CEO or chairman. 
 
Figure 3.3 Bisnode’s Expert Model  
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Rating Description 
No rating This entity often receives payment remarks that are of significance for the future operation of the 
enterprise. Essential information on the company may also be lacking, which makes it impossible 
to to make a qualified assessment of the entity's creditworthiness. 
Note: Translated from Norwegian by the author of this thesis 
 
Figure 3.3 Bisnode’s Expert Model, continues 
Source: (Bisnode Norway) 
 
In comparison to the big three, Bisnode has fewer rating categories and no opportunity to 
nuance the rating codes. From the wording in the table, it is understood that a company 
receiving an AAA-rating or AA-rating is satisfactory within all areas. When going one notch 
down, to an A-rating, the economy of the company is described as “somewhat weak”. 
Subsequently, when a company is rated B, the economy is considered “bad”. A rating C is 
not received until there is “negative information” available regarding the company or the 
leaders of the company. One must not forget that companies with a C-rating may be newly 
established companies with start-up problems that might quickly be resolved. The codes are 
linked to each company, and not related to any instrument that the companies may hold.  
None of the firms included in the sample have solicited ratings from any of the big three and 
none of them are listed on the stock exchange. There is thus less publicly available 
information on the relevant companies and, for this reason; the credit rating services offered 
by Bisnode are valuable.  
The rating codes are categorical variables, thus included in the model as dummy variables, 
further explained in section 3.9.1. To access the files, the statistical program Stata has been 
utilized. The process of selecting relevant data as well as the generating of variables can be 
reviewed in attachment 7.6, where the Stata-commands are documented.  
3.5.3 The chosen control variables 
The choice of control variables in this thesis depends on what information the Bisnode credit 
rating codes already comprise, documented in the section above.  
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Firstly, size is added as a control variable. It is represented by the sum of assets. Another 
measure for size is the number of employees. This information is, however, not available for 
2006 and 2007 and is thus not applied. The assumption is that larger firms receive more 
favorable terms when borrowing money than smaller firms. Having a large stock of assets 
may also indicate a greater opportunity for creditors to secure the loans. The size is averaged 
over the opening and ending balance and divided by 100.    
Secondly, the year of incorporation is added as a control variable. Bisnode added a 
categorical dummy dividing companies into two groups based on age, young companies and 
old companies. In this study, a control variable representing the year of incorporation as a 
continuous variable is added with the expectations that older companies, being more well-
established than newer companies, receive loans with more favorable interest rates. 
Ratios representing earning capacity, liquidity and solidity are assumed already included in 
the Bisnode credit rating code. However, as Bisnode pronounced that they are considering 
adding more key indicators put up against industry averages, a company’s liquidity ratio 
compared to its relevant industry average is also added as a control variable. The liquidity 
ratio is calculated as the current assets divided by the short-term debt. Both the value of the 
numerator and the denominator are averaged over the opening and ending balance sheet. 
Industry is added as a fourth control variable. According to Mjøs and Phan (2011), the 
industry “real estate and services” lends the most, against security in real estate. It is thus 
assumed that companies within the real estate industry, the corresponding industry in the 
SNF’s data set, pay the lowest interest rate. In the data set, industry is described by two 
industry variables. One created in 2002 and one in 2007. As the latter is newest and has less 
missing observations, this is chosen to represent the various industries.   
The level of security, or the level of mortgaged assets as it is labeled in the data set, is 
assumed to affect the interest rate level. However, not enough information was available to 
apply it as a control variable. The same goes for covenants and information regarding 
banking connections. As already mentioned, the analyses are executed for each year 
separately, so variables changing over time are not suitable.  
The chosen variables included in the further analysis are listed in table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 The relevant variables 
 Additional information 
Credit rating codes 
 
Categorical variables, added as dummies. 
Size Continuous variable, represented by the sum of assets, average of opening and 
ending balance sheet values, divided by 100. 
 
Year of incorporation Discrete variable. 
 
Liquidity ratio compared  
 
 
 
Industry 
 
Continuous variable, represented by the average liquidity ratio divided by the 
relevant industry’s average liquidity ratio. Current assets and short-term debt 
are averaged over the opening and ending balance sheet values. 
 
Categorical variables, added as dummies. 
 
 
The framework of the analysis first presented in figure 1.1 is now expanded and the 
relationship concentrated upon is the following. 
  
Figure 3.4 The foundation, expanded 
Together with the credit rating codes in the left square of figure 3.4, the control variables 
have now been identified. In the right square, the dependent variable is presented.  
3.6 Secondary data  
The data applied are multiple-sourced secondary data. Secondary means that the data are 
collected by other people than the author of this thesis. Multiple-source means that they are 
collected using several sources and gathered into one data set before employed (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).  
An advantage using secondary data is that they are already available for analysis, thus saving 
resources. Another advantage is that the quality of the data collection is most probably 
higher than if the collection was self-executed. Disadvantages may be that the purpose of the 
collection differs from the user’s needs (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). As mentioned, 
the data has been collected in order to enable SNF and NHH members to perform research 
Credit rating codes 
Size 
Year of incorporation 
Liquidity ratio compared 
Industry 
Interest rate 
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on Norwegian companies. This purpose is “wide”, thus not favoring any specific research 
question. On the one hand, this enables research with different goals to be performed on the 
same data set without any specific favoritism related to the collection of data. On the other 
hand, had the data been gathered for the sole reason of answering this report’s research 
question, additional information and variables would be acquired. Examples are more 
information regarding security, the number of employees, main bank connection, and less 
aggregated information regarding the various credits and the corresponding interest costs. 
However, all these factors are not publicly available, and they would have made the process 
quite demanding. It would thus not be a realistic choice when considering the time and 
resource limitations of a master thesis.     
The two following sub-sections, reliability and validity, critically review the data and the 
methods applied to prepare the data for analysis.  
3.7 Reliability 
When measuring reliability of the data, the data collection and selection techniques are put 
under the loop. The topic of interest is whether the same results might be reached in other 
settings and by other researchers. The data collectors are members of SNF and NHH. These 
are serious institutions and the level of precision required by these actors is assumed to be 
high. The same can be said about the other sources listed in section 3.2 such as Statistics 
Norway and the Brønnøysund Register Centre. This increases trust towards the data set.  
The data were not only collected, but also reviewed, by the same staff. The process and 
impact of this is well documented in the working document, increasing the reliability. The 
reliability connected to the time span 2005 to 2011 applied in this report increases even more 
as most of the missing data were detected between 1992 and 1998.  
After acquiring the data, the author of this thesis applied sample criteria in order to prepare 
the data for analysis. Due to high transparency around the process in section 3.4 and 3.5, the 
reliability of these techniques is not considered a concern.  
Some additional information was acquired through three interviews shortly described in 
section 3.1. The information derived from these interviews was facts and no interpretation of 
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statements was thus executed by the interviewer. The information gathered is thus 
considered reliable and valid.   
3.8 Validity 
High reliability is necessary for data to have high validity (Hellevik, 1999). Validity deals 
with the questions do the results truly say what they appear to? Is there truly a causal 
relationship between two variables? 
The independent variable is based on Bisnode’s default model. The dependent variable is a 
company’s average interest rate. To what degree a company is defaulting is assumed to be of 
importance when a creditor decides upon a suitable level of interest rate required. The 
probability of default also says something about the ability of a company to pay existing 
principals and interests. The causality between the two variables is assumed to be valid.     
One of the concerns is the validity of definitions. This regards the leap between a 
theoretically defined variable and an operationally defined variable. The theoretical interest 
rate is, as mentioned in section 2.1 “the per cent of premium paid on money” (Fischer, 1930, 
pp. 13-14). The operational interest rate per company was not available in the data set and 
was thus generated in the best possible way. It was generated as the sum of interest costs 
derived in the income statement divided by the generated interest-bearing debt based on the 
balance sheet accounts. The interest cost is a summation of all interest costs paid throughout 
the accounting year. The generated interest-bearing debt variable is only a snapshot of a 
value at a point in time. In order to make the denominator match the numerator slightly 
better, the average of the opening and ending balance sheet debt values were applied. 
Nevertheless, the opportunity of miscalculating the average interest rate is present as a 
company may change the level of the debt whenever desirable. For example reducing debt 
just before the end of the year reduces the value entered into the balance sheets and leads to 
inflated interest rates. The amount of interest cost cannot be changed or manipulated in the 
same way. The trimming of data was executed in response to this. 
Another issue is that each company carries equal amount of weight when calculating the 
average interest rates, even though the companies should be weighed according to the size of 
their interest-bearing debt.  
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One should also consider if there are other relevant control variables than those chosen 
(Hellevik, 1999). The number of control variables has been kept low. The ones included are 
mentioned across several sources, except for the liquidity ratio compared being added due to 
Bisnode’s consideration of variables compared to industry averages as potential 
improvements to their model. Due to the scope of this thesis as well as the limited access to 
relevant variables, other variables were not entered.  
The time period analyzed is considered appropriate. The financial crisis was included and 
added an interesting aspect to the assessment as the impact of the rating codes increased 
when the financial crisis struck. More information regarding this is found in section 5.2.3.  
Lastly, can the results be generalized? When deciding upon the potential degree of 
generalization of results, the selection criteria should be considered (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2009). Of the 3 179 684 observations, only 89 405 are left in the sample. The 
results only apply to profit maximizing limited liability companies. Larger companies listed 
on the stock exchange are not expected to be influenced as much by Bisnode’s credit rating 
codes when already rated by one of the big three. The credit rating procedures are specific to 
Bisnode and also specific to ratings applied in Norway. It is rational to assume that similar 
results would be found in other countries, especially in the Nordic ones, but the effect of the 
financial crisis would most likely impact differently, as countries were struck differently. 
Overall the results extracted from this thesis are considered valid.  
The presentation of the data is finished. In the following sub-section, the methods applied in 
order to arrive at the results are presented.    
3.9 Methods applied in the statistical analysis 
 
The goal of this thesis is to establish if there is a causal relationship between a company’s 
credit rating code, issued by an external business information provider, and its average 
interest rate. The research design performed can thus be said to be explanatory (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Whether a relationship exists is sought to be answered by 
applying regression analysis. This technique gives interpretable results based on statistical 
significance –a widely recognized method when analyzing causality.  
The methods applied when processing the data are discussed in section 3.4 and 3.5. 
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3.9.1 Regression analysis 
Regression analysis is an economic tool used to study the empirical correlation between 
variables (Biørn, 2009). It quantifies the cause and effect relationship between the dependent 
variable and each independent variable, holding other independent variables constant. A 
regression can have one or more of both independent and dependent variables. In this thesis 
multiple regression analysis with one dependent variable and several independent variables 
is applied. The formula for a linear multiple regression follows in equation 3.1.  
                               Equation 3.1 
Y= The dependent variable 
X= The independent variable 
β0 = The intercept 
β = The coefficients  
ε = The error term 
i, j, k… = specifying different variables and its corresponding coefficients 
The intercept represents the value of the dependent variable when none of the independent 
variables on the right hand side has an effect on the dependent variable. Analyzing the 
intercept does not always add value when viewed in isolation. This especially applies if the 
coefficients of the added variables cannot be expected to be zero simultaneously. Then, the 
intercept is only thought of as the “coefficient that determines the level of the regression 
line” (Watson & Stock, 2012, p. 152). The other coefficients describe the effect (in what 
direction and how much) each of the corresponding independent variables have on the 
dependent variable, controlled for the effect of other included independent variables. The 
error term specifies all other factors explaining Y that are not included as an independent 
variable. The error term is always greater than zero (Wooldridge, 2006). 
When the regression is based on a sample selected from a population, the regression formula 
looks like equation 3.2.  
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 ̂     ̂    ̂       ̂      ̂        ̂ Equation 3.2 
The  ̂-term is not the error term. It is the residual, calculated using the sample, but 
representing the error term in the population as the expected difference between them are 
zero (Wooldridge, 2006). The residual is the “difference between the observed values of the 
dependent variable and predicted variables based on the least squares coefficient estimates 
from a sample” (Berry, 1993, p. 27). 
When running regression analyses, both predicted values as well as residuals are of interest. 
Addressing the residual sheds a critical light on the model and increases the validity of the 
results. The reviewing of the regression assumptions is documented in section 4.2.1. 
The regression type used is called the Ordinary Least Squares, OLS. The OLS minimizes the 
sum of squared residuals (Wooldridge, 2006). The smaller the difference between the 
observed values (the values in the data set) and the predicted values (the values calculated by 
the regression formula), the better the model fits.  
The null hypothesis, H0, in a multiple regression analysis is that none of the independent 
variables significantly affect the dependent variable. The null hypothesis may be rejected if 
the F-value is above a certain threshold. The size of the threshold depends on the number of 
independent variables, the number of observations and the chosen significance level. A 
significance level is the chosen level at which the null hypothesis is rejected when it in fact 
is true (Wooldridge, 2006). In this thesis, the chosen level is five per cent. A five per cent 
chance of drawing the wrong conclusion is thus permitted. As long as one variable is 
significant, the F-value is above its critical value and the null hypothesis is rejected. The 
significance of the effect of each variable depends on the t- and the p-values. The t-value 
describes each coefficient’s significance. If the test is two-sided using the five per cent 
significance level, the null hypothesis is that the corresponding coefficient may possibly be 
zero. Had it been one-sided the hypothesis would express in which direction the coefficient 
is thought to be significant. The absolute t-values have to be larger than 1.96 in order to 
reject the null hypothesis at a five per cent significance level (Wooldridge, 2006). This 
means that the coefficient’s value is more than 1.96 times larger than its standard error of 
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means. The standard error of means is a measure of the deviation from the calculated 
average value of the coefficient if a new sample was drawn from the population
14
.  
The R2 is the coefficient of determination, describing how much of the variance in the 
dependent variable the model describes. When multiple independent variables are used, the 
adjusted R
2
, R
2
adj, is a better measure, taking the increased complexity of the model into 
consideration (Midtbø, 2012).  
Treatment of categorical variables in regression analysis 
When adding categorical or ordinal variables as independent variables on the right hand side 
of a regression equation, the variables need to be transformed into “dummies”. This applies 
to the credit rating variable and the industry variable. Dummies describe qualitative 
phenomena and thereby increase the quality of any study (Midtbø, 2012).  One may use 
dummies to test if a regression is the same for two or several groups. Dummies take the 
values 1 or 0. For example, is the interest rate the same for a company with an AAA-rating 
as for a company with an AA-rating? In the regression, one dummy category must be left out 
as the “reference group”. If the AAA-rating is the reference group and the coefficient of the 
AA-rating is positive (and significant), the interpretation is that companies rated AA have 
higher interest rates than companies belonging to the reference group AAA.  
In order to investigate the difference between two credit rating codes where none of them are 
the chosen reference dummy, Stata’s built-in tool, lincom, is applied. Lincom calculates the 
difference between two categorical variables and produces both the coefficient, the standard 
error of means, the t-value, the p-value and a confidence interval, just like a regression 
analysis does. Lincom is not applied on the industries as a detailed study of the effect of 
industry affiliation is not of interest. 
The application of these methods has led to the results presented in the next section. 
                                                 
14 Occasionally in this paper, the standard error of means is referred to as only “the standard error”.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis  
In this section, the characteristics of the variables are described; creating a greater 
understanding of the behavior of the variables. The behavior of the independent variables 
compared to the interest rate is also defined. This supports the results in the regression 
analysis, as their causal relationship is under the loop. 
4.1.1 The dependent variable, the interest rate 
The descriptive statistics of the interest rate is documented in table 4.1. Both the frequency 
as well as the central tendency, the spread and the skewness and kurtosis is described for all 
seven years. The mean, median, minimum and maximum interest rate as well as the standard 
deviation and the standard error of means are multiplied by 100, thus represented as 
percentages. The end column shows the total number when it comes to frequencies, whereas 
for the other results in the table, it shows the average value (i.e. the average interest rate and 
the average standard deviation). An exception is the median, which is simply the median and 
not an average value.  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics on the interest rate per year  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total/ 
Average 
Frequency 13 479 12 058 12 275 11 439 13 957 13 016 13 181 89 405 
Mean interest rate (%) 6.683  6.569  7.811  9.415  7.759 7.199  7.157 7.485 
Median interest rate (%) 5.941 5.926  7.252  8.960  7.350  6.705  6.646  6.935 
Standard deviation (%) 3.695 3.614  3.809  4.310  3.937  3.783  3.726  3.940 
Standard error (%) 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.040 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.013 
Skewness 1.031 0.996 0.794 0.647 0.701 0.840 0.810 0.840 
Kurtosis 4.196 4.104 3.995 3.999 3.736 3.934 3.871 3.967 
Min. interest rate (%) 0.031 0.032 0.025  0.032 0.011 0.015  0.026 0.011 
Max. interest rate (%) 20.225 19.391 21.015 24.277 21.395 20.351 20.000 24.277 
 
The interest rate for limited liability companies has varied greatly from 2005 to 2011. The 
lowest average interest rate was observed in 2006, whereas it peaked in 2008. The difference 
between the highest and lowest mean interest rate is 2.846 per cent and the change occurred 
over only 2 years. The average interest rate quickly dropped again to 7.759 per cent in 2009 
from 9.415 per cent in 2008, dropping even lower in 2010 and again in 2011. The mean is 
the average value of the sample and represents the expected mean of the population. The 
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median is the central value, and is equal to the mean if the distribution is symmetrical around 
the mean (Wooldridge, 2006). If not, it is connected to skewness, further described below. 
As illustrated in figure 4.1, the sample mean always lies above the sample median. Large 
interest rate levels are increasing the mean but not affecting the median in the same way.  
 
Figure 4.1 The mean and median interest rate per year 
Information regarding an average value is often supplemented with information regarding 
the spread. Even though the mean interest rate in 2005 is 6.569 per cent, it does not 
automatically entail that all observations this year is close to this value. The standard 
deviation is the positive square root of the variance. It depicts the average deviation from the 
mean when choosing a random value from the sample, and thus expresses the interval in 
which a value of an observation lies. The interval depends on the significance level chosen. 
The interest rate’s average standard deviation is depicted in table 4.1 as 3.940 per cent. 
When applying 68 per cent certainty, the value of a random observation lays within the 
interval the average +/- one standard deviation. With 68 per cent certainty, the value of an 
observation, averaged over all years, lies between 11.425 and 3.545 per cent; cf. table 4.1. 
This spread is broad and the variation within the sample’s interest rate levels is thus high. 
The standard errors of means portray how much the mean value would change if another 
sample had been chosen from the population. These are low, indicating small changes if 
other samples had been picked. The accuracy of the mean interest rate rests on the large 
amount of observations as the formula is σ/√n. σ is the standard deviation and n is the 
frequency of observations. In 2005, the mean interest rate at the five per cent significance 
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level lay within the confidence interval of 6.619 – 6.747 per cent (calculated as the mean 
value +/- two standard errors).  
The kurtosis and skewness describe the distribution of the variable. The kurtosis describes 
the thickness of the tail of the distribution as well as the size of the distribution’s peak. If 
high, it is a sign of influential observations (Watson & Stock, 2012). In a normal 
distribution, the kurtosis is normally 3.000. The skewness describes the symmetry of the 
distribution. When the median is smaller than the average, this indicates right skewness
15
 
and the opposite is implied when the median is greater than the average. A normal 
distribution has a skewness of zero.  
In figure 4.2, average interest rate observations from each year are illustrated in histograms. 
The X-axis shows the interest rates and the height of the histograms shows the frequency per 
interest rate. The overlying line represents a normal distribution. This figure illustrates the 
large standard deviations tabulated in table 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.2 The distribution of the interest rate per year 
                                                 
15 Also called positive skewness. 
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Table 4.2 also illustrates the skewness, ranging from 0.647 to 1.031, indicating a somewhat 
right-skewed sample. The kurtosis, ranging from 3.736 to 4.196, indicates a sharper peak 
than a normal distribution as well as thicker tails, signifying a presence of influential values.   
4.1.2 The independent variables 
The credit rating codes 
The rating codes are categorical variables; therefore descriptive statistics are not suitable on 
the variable alone, except for frequency. In table 4.2, the frequency of the rating code as well 
as the development of the average interest rate over each credit rating code is displayed. The 
development is depicted using the mean, the standard deviation and the standard error, 
entered as percentages. The far right column depicts the total number of observations, and 
the average value for the other rows of information. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics on the interest rate per credit rating code and year 
  
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total/ 
Average 
Frequency 
  
  
  
  
C 118 73 125 130 228 161 241 1 076 
B 1 695 1 299 1 308 1 314 2 271 1 911 1 770 11 568 
A 4 157 3 668 3 489 3 560 4 006 3 771 3 572 26 223 
AA 5 783 5 126 5 268 4 749 5 649 5 383 5 576 37 564 
AAA 1 726 1 862 2 085 1 686 1 803 1 790 2 022 12 974 
  Sum 13 479 12 058 12 275 11 439 13 957 13 016 13 181 89 405 
Mean 
 (%) 
  
  
  
C 7.952 9.260 9.826 12.385 9.991 9.924 9.496 9.857 
B 7.475 7.401 8.698 10.483 8.826 8.275 8.136 8.445 
A 6.867 6.798 7.892 9.454 7.742 7.169 7.095 7.553 
AA 6.473 6.428 7.724 9.206 7.497 6.908 6.933 7.273 
AAA 6.084 5.819 7.215 8.859 6.988 6.744 6.745 6.908 
  Mean 6.684 6.569 7.811 7.415 7.759 7.199 7.157 7.485 
Standard 
deviation 
 (%) 
  
  
  
C 4.163 4.568 3.629 5.58 4.439 4.709 4.466 4.744 
B 3.818 3.875 3.781 4.656 4.173 4.056 3.990 4.184 
A 3.726 3.529 3.742 4.195 3.916 3.750 3.699 3.89 
AA 3.615 3.565 4.066 4.213 3.850 3.644 3.630 3.851 
AAA 3.550 3.480 4.506 4.198 3.801 3.554 3.450 3.768 
  Mean 3.695 3.614 3.809 4.310 3.937 3.783 3.726 3.940 
Standard 
error 
(%) 
C 0.383 0.535 0.403 0.489 0.294 0.371 0.288 0.145 
B 0.093 0.108 0.112 0.128 0.088 0.093 0.095 0.039 
A 0.058 0.058 0.063 0.070 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.024 
AA 0.048 0.050 0.052 0.061 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.020 
AAA 0.085 0.081 0.079 0.102 0.090 0.084 0.077 0.033 
 Mean 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.040 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.013 
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For each year, most companies are AA-rated companies. For all years except 2009 and 2010, 
the order is AA, A, AAA, B, C. In 2009 and 2010, however, there are more companies being 
rated B than AAA. See figure 4.3 for an illustration of the frequency of credit rating codes, 
averaged over all years.  
 
Figure 4.3 The average frequency per credit rating code 
 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the interest rate per rating code. Each line represents one specific 
credit rating code. The AAA-rating is the bottom line, indicating that companies rated AAA 
have, on average, the lowest interest rate each year. The line lying above the AAA-rating is 
the AA-rating and then follows the A-rating, the B-rating and the C-rating. The C- and the 
B-lines lie noticeably above the others, while the A- to AAA-lines ratings are closer to each 
other. 
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Figure 4.4 The interest rate per credit rating code and year16 
Regarding the development over time, the rating codes clearly share the same pattern. Two 
exceptions are the average interest rate of C-rated companies increasing from 2005 to 2006 
and the interest rate of AAA- and AA-rated companies slightly increasing in 2011. All 
average interest rates peaked in 2008. 
There are quite large interest rate deviations within each credit rating code. This means that, 
even though it occurs as such on average, C-rated companies will not always have higher 
interest rates than B-rated companies etc. Regarding time, the deviations are largest in 2008 
(looking at the standard deviation in table 4.2). Regarding the rating codes, companies rated 
C have the highest deviations. All rating codes have a minimum interest rate between zero 
and one per cent and a maximum interest rate of at least 18 per cent. This, together with 
large standard deviations, depicts large variations in the value of average interest rate 
observations for all credit rating codes. This is also illustrated in figure 4.5, where the X-axis 
is the interest rate and the height of the histograms represents the density. The results are 
averaged over all years.  
                                                 
16 As the data are discrete, it can be argued that a histogram should be applied. However, a scatter diagram creates an 
informative impression of how rating codes influence the average interest rate compared to one another and over time. 
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Figure 4.5. The spread of the average interest rate per credit rating code 
The standard errors are very low for AAA- to B-rated companies with average values 
between 0.048 and 0.093 per cent. The average standard error of means of C-rated 
companies is larger, 0.383 per cent. As the description of the average interest rate of C-rated 
companies is based on much fewer observations, the uncertainty regarding the average 
interest rate is greater. 
Year of incorporation 
The year of incorporation
17
 is a discrete value and descriptive statistics is of reduced value. 
Discrete means that the variable takes on a finite number (Wooldridge, 2006). It spans from 
1853 to 2010 and has 111 unique values. The year with most incorporations is 2006.  
Size 
Size is a continuous variable, represented by the average of the sum of assets in the opening 
and ending balance sheet. Continuous means that it can take on any value (Wooldridge, 
2006).  Descriptive statistics can be found in table 4.3. The far right column depicts the total 
number of observations, and the average value for the other rows of information.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The year of incorporation is consistently not called “age”. This is because these two labels carry scales behaving in the 
opposite directions. Age goes from a higher value to a lower value (80 years old vs. 10 years old) when moving towards 
present time, whereas the scale of year of incorporation goes the opposite way, from a low value to a high one (1853 vs. 
1900).  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics on the size per year  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total/ 
Average 
Frequency 13 479 12 058 12 275 11 439 13 957 13 016 13 181 89 405 
Mean (%) 2 093  2 309 2 413  2 529  2 435  2 509 2 598  2 410  
St. deviation (%)  1 430  1 606  1 653  1 789 1 686 1 734  1 794  1 680 
Standard error (%) 12.319 14.626 14.922 16.725 14.270 15.200 15.627 5.618 
 
The average size of the companies in the sample is NOK 2.4 million. The standard 
deviations are very high, indicating large spreads in the value of the observations. The 
standard error is substantially smaller, indicating less uncertainty around the average size in 
the sample.  
Liquidity ratio compared 
The characteristics of the liquidity ratio are presented in table 4.4. The far right column 
depicts the total number of observations, and the average value for the other rows of 
information. 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics on the liquidity ratio compared per year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total/ 
Average 
Frequency 13 470 12 051 12 265 11 431 13 947 13 002 13 165 89 331 
Mean (%) 0.707 0.918 0.937 1.011 1.09 1.088 1.241 1.000 
St. deviation (%) 1.447 5.115 3.545 7.279 12.759 7.796 12.63 8.374 
Standard error (%) 0.012 0.046 0.032 0.068 0.108 0.068 0.111 0.073 
 
The reason for the difference in frequency in the far right column depicts the total number of 
observations, and the average value for the other rows of information. 
table 4.4 and table 4.5 is that 74 liquidity ratio compared observations are “missing”. This is 
because the denominator, short-term debt, is zero for these observations (only observations 
with negative short-term debt were trimmed). 
The liquidity ratio compared depends on the relationship between a company’s average 
current assets and its average short-term debt as well as the value of the average liquidity 
ratio per industry. The average liquidity ratio compared is 1.000. Averaged over all 
industries and years, the companies seem to have liquidity ratios similar to their peers. 
However, the large standard deviations tell the reader that there is a large spread in values. 
These deviations are even bigger than the average values. 71 156 observations have a 
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liquidity ratio compared lower than one but only 18 175 have a ratio above one. Thus, 
certain companies have very large values, increasing the average liquidity ratios compared. 
The standard errors of means are quite low, indicating less uncertainty around the value of 
the mean liquidity ratio compared, had another sample been picked from the data set.   
Industry  
Industry is a categorical variable, similar to the rating codes, with 12 categories. In table 4.5 
the frequency of observations per industry as well as information regarding the average 
interest rate per industry category are documented. The far right column depicts the total 
number of observations, and the average value for the other rows of information. The mean, 
standard deviation and the standard error of means are entered as percentages.   
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics on the interest rate per industry and year 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total/ 
Average 
Frequency Primary 313 303 330 295 347 330 301 2 219 
 Oil/gas/mining 56 57 62 59 60 61 62 417 
 Manufacturing 1 322 1 097 1 033 933 1 119 1 004 952 7 460 
 Energy 77 75 89 100 111 116 116 684 
 Construction 2 317 2 084 2 149 1 961 2 499 2 413 2 476 15 899 
 Trade 4 128 3 607 3 564 3 271 3 835 3 495 3 428 25 328 
 Shipping 59 52 60 57 56 48 56 388 
 Travel 1 340 1 220 1 252 1 170 1 435 1 304 1 376 9 097 
 Tele/IT 294 273 248 229 270 259 254 1 827 
 Real estate 951 942 1 015 1 042 1 279 1 242 1 327 7 798 
 Services 1 617 1 408 1 438 1 329 1 748 1 614 1 635 10 789 
 Public/culture 1 005 940 1 035 993 1 198 1 130 1 198 7 499 
 Mean 13479 12058 12275 11439 13957 13016 13181 89405 
Mean (%) 
 
Primary 6.102 6.180 7.116 9.051 7.441 6.619 6.462 6.991 
Oil/gas/mining 5.949 6.511 7.276 8.827 8.663 7.709 7.127 7.453 
Manufacturing 6.962 6.733 8.110 9.650 7.902 7.538 7.453 7.705 
Energy 6.012 5.995 7.115 8.605 6.167 5.912 5.499 6.454 
Construction 6.840 6.852 8.363 10.022 8.358 7.757 7.620 7.939 
 Trade 7.345 7.205 8.292 10.046 8.439 7.880 7.979 8.132 
 Shipping 5.716 6.204 7.039 8.520 6.562 6.725 6.472 6.754 
 Travel 6.145 6.116 7.517 9.143 7.476 6.845 6.810 7.126 
 Tele/IT 6.845 6.327 7.535 8.947 7.078 6.673 6.571 7.097 
 Real estate 4.977 5.166 6.384 7.809 5.804 5.388 5.370 5.830 
 Services 6.664 6.458 7.767 9.273 7.683 7.062 7.029 7.386 
 Public/culture 5.889 5.733 6.945 8.492 7.136 6.609 6.656 6.790 
 Mean 6.684 6.569 7.811 9.415 7.759 7.199 7.157 7.485 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics on interest rate per industry and year, continues 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total/ 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Primary 3.535 3.422 3.086 3.982 3.734 3.323 3.203 3.595 
Oil/gas/mining 2.974 2.891 3.555 3.597 3.623 3.842 3.485 3.558 
Manufacturing 3.717 3.539 3.902 4.399 3.946 3.949 3.765 3.975 
Energy 3.359 3.051 3.119 3.545 3.158 2.985 2.099 3.191 
Construction 3.701 3.629 3.835 4.307 4.023 3.779 3.730 3.976 
 Trade 4.007 4.013 4.163 4.800 4.320 4.179 4.200 4.321 
 Shipping 3.233 2.666 3.001 4.174 1.902 2.206 3.001 3.078 
 Travel 3.104 3.079 3.387 3.788 3.521 3.316 3.195 3.472 
 Tele/IT 3.849 3.626 3.928 4.354 4.023 4.250 4.248 4.104 
 Real estate 2.661 2.536 2.762 3.160 2.608 2.523 2.380 2.798 
 Services 3.747 3.679 3.935 4.285 4.149 3.748 3.809 4.000 
 Public/culture 3.040 2.998 3.225 3.658 3.467 3.304 3.131 3.370 
 Mean 3.695 3.614 3.809 4.310 3.973 3.783 3.726 3.940 
Standard 
error  
(%) 
Primary 0.130 0.143 0.146 0.148 0.132 0.138 0.130 0.052 
Oil/gas/mining 0.055 0.062 0.064 0.067 0.055 0.060 0.060 0.023 
Manufacturing 0.256 0.262 0.251 0.256 0.230 0.234 0.225 0.092 
Energy 0.065 0.072 0.077 0.087 0.075 0.082 0.081 0.029 
Construction 0.325 0.344 0.343 0.352 0.325 0.341 0.340 0.128 
Trade 0.397 0.417 0.410 0.423 0.378 0.388 0.382 0.151 
Shipping 0.057 0.060 0.063 0.066 0.054 0.053 0.057 0.022 
Travel 0.258 0.275 0.273 0.283 0.257 0.263 0.266 0.101 
Tele/IT 0.126 0.135 0.127 0.131 0.117 0.122 0.120 0.047 
Real estate 0.221 0.244 0.249 0.269 0.244 0.258 0.262 0.094 
Services 0.280 0.292 0.290 0.300 0.280 0.289 0.287 0.109 
Public/culture 0.226 0.244 0.251 0.263 0.237 0.247 0.250 0.093 
 Mean 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.012   
 
Within this control variable there are large differences in the frequencies of observations per 
category. There are few oil/gas/mining, energy and shipping companies involved. Most 
observations belong to trade, and then follow construction and services.  
To understand the development of the describing numbers above more easily, look at figure 
4.6 and figure 4.7. Figure 4.6 shows the interest rate averaged over all seven years, per 
industry code. To see the changes over time in more details, figure 4.7 is more suitable. 
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Figure 4.6 The interest rate per industry category 
  
Figure 4.7 The interest rate per industry and year 
It is quite evident that timing plays a large role in the level of interest rate per industry. The 
time patterns are similar and the average interest rate peaks in 2008. The lowest interest rate 
is mostly found in either 2005 or 2006. The exception is energy with the lowest average 
interest rate in 2011. For all years, real estate has the lowest interest rate, never above eight 
per cent and keeping steady around five per cent from 2009 to 2011. The highest average 
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interest rate is held by trade, except for in 2007 and 2009 where construction-companies and 
oil/gas/mining-businesses had the highest average interest rates. The average interest rate of 
the oil/gas/mining industry does not have the same characteristic decline in interest rate in 
2009.  
Over time, the standard deviation and the standard error of means are highest for 2008. 
Regarding industries, the former is highest for trade, telecommunications and IT and 
services, whereas the latter is the highest for construction, trade and services –despite the 
fact that these industries have the highest frequencies.  
After becoming more acquainted to the relevant variables, the next step is regression 
analysis.  
4.2 Regression Analysis  
In the previous section, various statistical characteristics of the variables were described. In 
this section, the statistical significance of the causal relationships between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables are tested, applying regression analysis. All models 
are multiple regression models. In model one the interest rate is analyzed on the basis of 
changes in the credit rating codes. In model two, age, size and the liquidity ratio compared 
are added as control variables. In model three, industry categories are added. When referring 
to the effect of one of the independent variables on the dependent variable, it is assumed that 
all other variables in the model are held constant.  
Firstly, the regression assumptions are addressed. 
4.2.1 Regression assumptions reviewed 
It is important to review the model residuals in order to ensure the quality of the models. See 
section 3.9.1 for a definition of residuals. There are especially three assumptions regarding 
the residuals that should be held in order to induce trust towards the regression analysis 
results. These involve homoscedasticity, independency and normal distribution. The normal 
distribution test is executed last, in order to perform the test on the models after rectifying 
potential homoscedasticity and dependency. In addition, multicollinearity is addressed, a 
problem which may occur when having more than one explanatory variable.  
 62 
The testing is documented for model one, with no control variables, and model three, with all 
control variables included. The results are assumed to apply to model two as well.   
Homoscedasticity 
Residuals should be homoscedastic. This means that the expected average value of the 
residuals is zero, i.e. that the residuals cancel each other out. If they are heteroscedastic, the 
variance around the regression line varies with the dependent variable, thus, the model’s 
prediction ability varies with the value of the dependent variable.  
In order to test for heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test is applied. The results of the 
test for model one and three are documented in table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 Breusch Pagan test of homoscedasticity, model one and three18 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Model one Chi
2
 16.98 23.77 30.10 50.51 34.41 70.20 66.35 
 p-value 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
Model three Chi
2
 241.01 285.65 143.60 271.42 443.53 504.21 646.76 
 p-value 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 
In order not to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, the value of the chi-squared 
test of model one has to be below 9.49 at the five per cent significance level. The 
corresponding limit for model three is 28.87. All chi-squared values in table 4.6 are above 
these limits and all p-values are below five per cent. The null hypotheses are rejected each 
year, and the residuals cannot be said not to be heteroscedastic at the five per cent 
significance level. A solution is to run robust regressions. This means adjusting the standard 
errors, making them valid even when the form of the heteroscedasticity is unknown 
(Wooldridge, 2006). The coefficients’ values and the R2adj do not change. This solution is 
especially suited for large samples, like the one in this report.  
Independency 
The residual should be independent and not correlated with itself. If this is not controlled for, 
the standard errors become too small. This is especially present for panel data, i.e. data over 
more than one time period. Regarding time, the problem is called autocorrelation. In this 
thesis, each year is analyzed separately in order to remove this risk of autocorrelation.  
                                                 
18 The significance level is never zero, thus entered as 0.0005.  
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Independency can also be a problem within groups of units. For example, two companies 
with the same rating code can have more similar characteristics than two companies with 
different rating codes. A solution is to use dummy variables. The variation between groups is 
held constant and the focus is on the variances within the group. These are applied to the 
credit rating codes and the industry categories. Clustering the panel variables is also done for 
the same reason (Midtbø, 2012). The panel variables used for clustering are the organization 
numbers.    
Normal distribution  
The residuals should be normally distributed so that the chance of under- and over-
estimating a value is about the same (Midtbø, 2012). The residuals’ distributions after 
running robust regressions with clustered panel data are illustrated in figure 4.8 and figure 
4.9. Normal distribution is bell curved. The X-axis shows the interest rate and the height of 
the histograms shows the density. From looking at figure 4.8, the residuals seem 
approximately normally distributed. See attachment 7.3 and 7.4 to see the residuals plotted 
against a normal distribution in q-q-plots.  
 
Figure 4.8 The distribution of residuals, model one 
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Figure 4.9 The distribution of residuals, model three 
 
In order to test the distribution more accurately, a skewness and kurtosis test called the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is performed. The results of the test are documented in table 4.7.    
Table 4.7 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normal distribution, model one and three19 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Model one Combined K-S 0.0995 0.0947 0.0823 0.0767 0.0736 0.0782 0.0810 
 p-value 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
Model three Combined K-S 0.0948 0.0912 0.0822 0.0807 0.0726 0.0762 0.0772 
 p-value 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test tests if data is of a specific distribution. In this case, the 
distribution of the residuals of the models is tested against the normal distribution. The null 
hypothesis of normality is rejected as the p-value for all years is below five per cent. In order 
to achieve normally distributed residuals, the residuals may be transformed. The residuals 
were tested for several types of transformations and the results from the test run on the 2005-
values can be seen in figure 4.10 and figure 4.11 as well as in table 4.8. The diagram named 
identity is the current state of the residuals’ distribution.  
 
                                                 
19 The significance level is never zero, thus entered as 0.0005. 
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Figure 4.10 Transformation attempts on residuals, model one in 2005 
 
Figure 4.11 Transformation attempts on residuals, model three in 2005 
The current distributions seem to be the one closest to a normal distribution.  
Table 4.8 Transformation attempts on residuals, model one and three in 2005 
 Formula chi
2
 p-value 
cubic residual^3 . . 
square residual^2 . . 
identity residual . . 
square root square root(residual) . . 
log log(residual) . . 
1/(square root) 1/square root(residual) . . 
inverse 1/residual . . 
1/square 1/(residual^2) . . 
1/cubic 1/(residual^3) . . 
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In table 4.8, the null-hypothesis is that the transformation does not apply. If the p-value had 
been above five per cent, the data would have been transformed. In table 4.8, it is evident 
that none of the transformations would lead to more normally distributed residuals. The 
calculations above are gathered from testing the residuals from the regression analyses in 
2005. The same results apply to all years. As normality tests are very sensitive to deviations 
from the normal distribution when the sample is large (Midtbø, 2012), normality is still 
assumed. The regression results are assumed to be reliable.   
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity can occur when a regression model contains several explanatory variables 
and at least two of them are correlated with each other. One example is when the number of 
dummy variables equals the number of groups represented. To avoid this, one reference 
category is always taken out when entering credit rating codes and industry categories into 
the regression. The rating code AAA and the real estate industry are chosen to be omitted. If 
not selected manually, Stata, nevertheless, automatically omits one of the categories in order 
to avoid multicollinearity. Models with a large R2adj often have problems with 
multicollinearity (Midtbø, 2012). The regression models presented in section 5.2 do not have 
large R2adj.   
High multicollinearity does not violate the assumption, but perfect multicollinearity does 
(Midtbø, 2012). Model one and three are tested using the variation inflation factor test. A 
rule of thumb is that a value below ten is not considered a problem (Midtbø, 2012). The test 
is taken on robust regressions controlled for clusters within organization numbers and the 
results can be seen in table 4.9 and table 4.10. 
Table 4.9. Variation inflation factor test of multicollinearity, model one 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.11 1.08 1.10 
B 1.73 1.51 1.45 1.57 1.89 1.76 1.62 
A 2.36 2.07 1.91 2.14 2.30 2.21 2.02 
AA 2.48 2.16 2.01 2.23 2.46 2.35 2.17 
Average VIF 1.91 1.69 1.61 1.75 1.94 1.85 1.73 
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Table 4.10 Variation inflation factor test of multicollinearity, model three 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C 1.06 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.12 1.09 1.11 
B 1.79 1.58 1.53 1.65 1.97 1.84 1.68 
A 2.45 2.19 2.04 2.29 2.41 2.31 2.11 
AA 2.50 2.18 2.04 2.26 2.48 2.37 2.18 
Primary 1.31 1.30 1.30 1.26 1.25 1.24 1.21 
Oil/gas/mining 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.05 
Manufacturing 2.19 2.01 1.89 1.78 1.76 1.70 1.63 
Energy 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.08 
Construction 2.94 2.75 2.67 2.49 2.50 2.47 2.73 
Trade 3.82 3.47 3.30 3.07 3.02 2.90 2.67 
Shipping 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Travel 2.22 2.12 2.06 1.96 1.95 1.89 1.87 
Tele/IT 1.29 1.28 1.24 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.18 
Real Estate 2.47 2.28 2.22 2.10 2.15 2.01 2.04 
Services 1.97 1.90 1.92 1.85 1.84 1.81 1.80 
Size  1.07 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Age 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05 
Liquidity compared 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 
Average VIF 1.79 1.69 1.65 1.63 1.67 1.62 1.57 
  
The values are well below ten, indicating no problems concerning multicollinearity in the 
sample.  
Briefly summarized, robust regressions are run to make the standard error of means valid, 
each year is analyzed separately to avoid autocorrelation, and dummy variables and 
clustering of organization numbers are implemented to avoid dependency. All these 
applications lead to more trustworthy regression analyses.  
In the following sections, the regression results are described. In section five, they are 
discussed. Technical terms are explained in section 3.9.1, but also often repeated in the 
following sections whilst put into context.    
4.2.2 Model one 
The first regression executed is called model one. The independent variables are the credit 
rating codes. The AAA-rating code is the reference dummy. The null hypothesis is that all 
coefficients belonging to the credit rating codes are equal to zero, i.e. have no effect on the 
interest rate.  
The model is documented in table 4.11. The top value for each variable is the coefficient, the 
second value is the robust standard error of means and the third value is the t-value. The two 
former values together with the R
2
adj are entered as percentages. 
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Table 4.11 Regression analysis, model one 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C vs. AAA 1.868*** 3.441*** 2.611*** 3.526*** 3.003*** 3.181*** 2.751*** 
 0.391 0.537 0.409 0.498 0.307 0.379 0.297 
 4.775 6.406 6.379 7.077 9.79 8.382 9.255 
B vs. AAA 1.391*** 1.582*** 1.483*** 1.624*** 1.838*** 1.531*** 1.390*** 
 0.126 0.134 0.138 0.164 0.125 0.125 0.122 
 11.032 11.775 10.771 9.896 14.682 12.234 11.398 
A vs. AAA 0.783*** 0.979*** 0.677*** 0.595*** 0.754*** 0.425*** 0.350*** 
 0.103 0.099 0.102 0.124 0.109 0.104 0.099 
 7.589 9.845 6.663 4.794 6.928 4.097 3.55 
AA vs. AAA 0.390*** 0.609*** 0.510*** 0.347** 0.509*** 0.164* 0.188** 
 0.098 0.095 0.095 0.119 0.103 0.098 0.091 
 3.986 6.436 5.363 2.915 4.933 1.681 2.071 
Constant 
(AAA) 
6.084*** 5.819*** 7.215*** 8.859*** 6.988*** 6.744*** 6.745*** 
0.085 0.081 0.079 0.102 0.089 0.084 0.077 
71.209 72.164 90.79 86.65 78.082 80.299 87.929 
F-value 40.57 48.77 36.86 36.74 76.39 62.62 55.46 
R
2
adj 1.202 1.727 1.281 1.557 2.325 2.245 1.964 
Frequency 13 479 12 058 12 275 11 439 13 957 13 016 13 181 
Note: The stars denote the p-values, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
With a degree of freedom-numerator at four and a denominator at ∞, the F-value is above 
2.37 and is thus sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis each year. The difference is 
significantly different from zero at the five per cent significance level, each year. This 
indicates that the interest rate of AAA-rated companies is different from the interest rate of 
at least one other rating code.  
The coefficients of the non-omitted parameters describe the difference between the average 
interest rate of each credit rating code and the average interest rate of AAA-rated companies. 
The coefficients are positive, thus describing how much higher the average interest rates for 
AA-, A-, B- and C-rated companies are compared to AAA-rated companies.  
For 2005 the regression formula appears like equation 4.1.  
Y = 6.084 + 1.868 * C + 1.391 * B + 0.783 + A + 0.390 * AA  Equation 4.1 
The intercept, 6.084 per cent, being the interest rate of an AAA-rated company, is also found 
in table 4.2 in the descriptive analysis. If a company has a B-rating, B is one and the other 
rating codes are zero (referring to the treatment of dummy variables). The average interest 
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rate would, according to the regression equation, be 6.084 per cent + 1.391 per cent * 1 = 
7.475 per cent. This value is also found in table 4.2.  
Almost all t-values, describing the significance of each parameter, are above 1.96 and so 
these results are statistically significant at the five per cent significance level. The p-values 
below five per cent indicate the same
20
. There is thus a five (or less) per cent chance that the 
average interest rates belonging to different rating codes indeed are similar (that the null 
hypothesis is falsely rejected). One exception is found in 2010, where the interest rate of 
AA-rated companies was only significantly different from the interest rate of AAA-rated 
companies at a ten per cent significance level (grey area in table 4.11).  
When only looking at the value of the coefficients of the credit rating codes, the largest 
difference is found between C- and AAA-rated companies in 2008. The difference is 3.526 
per cent. However, when considering the standard error as well, it is evident that there is a 
greater uncertainty around this difference than, for example, the difference between B-rated 
and AAA-rated companies in 2009, where the t-value is double the size compared to the 
former example. The larger the t-value is, the smaller is the standard error relative to the 
value of the coefficient. The largest robust standard errors of means belong to the C-rated 
companies
21
 and the largest robust standard errors relative to the value of their coefficient 
belong to rating code AA- and A-rated companies. The largest t-values are held by B-rated 
companies each year, due to the combination of large coefficients and low robust standard 
error of means.  
The credit rating codes are categorical and the AAA-rating is the omitted variable. This 
means that when all parameters included in the model (C, B, A, AA) are zero, the company 
in question is AAA-rated and the constant thus depicts the interest rate of an AAA-rated 
company (it therefore says “(AAA)” below the constant in table 4.11).   
When applying table 4.11 it is possible to read off the difference between each pair of rating 
codes by looking at the deviation between the values of their coefficients. However, the 
                                                 
20 Most of the p-values imply that the differences between the average interest rates of AAA-rated companies and 
companies rated otherwise are statistically different from zero at the one per cent significance level –but the focus in this 
thesis is mainly kept on the five per cent significance level, unless otherwise stated. 
21 In this case, “the C-rated companies” refers to the average interest rate difference between C- and AAA-rated companies. 
Such abbreviations are applied throughout the thesis for reader friendliness.  
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significance of these differences is not available for interpretation. As the significance of the 
difference between each pair of credit rating codes is of interest, an additional analysis has 
been documented in table 4.12. The left column depicts the remaining credit rating codes 
being compared. The top value for each comparison is the coefficient, the second value is the 
robust standard error of means and the third value is the t-value. The two former values are 
entered as percentages. 
Table 4.12 Interest rate differences from credit rating code B to AA, model one 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C vs. B 0.477 1.858*** 1.128*** 1.901*** 1.165*** 1.650*** 1.361*** 
 0.393 0.542 0.417 0.504 0.306 0.382 0.302 
 1.21 3.43 2.71 3.77 3.80 4.32 4.50 
C vs. A 1.085*** 2.461*** 1.934*** 2.931*** 2.249*** 2.755*** 2.401*** 
 0.386 0.534 0.406 0.493 0.300 0.375 0.294 
 2.81 4.61 4.76 5.95 7.50 7.35 8.17 
C vs. AA 1.478*** 2.831*** 2.101*** 3.179*** 2.494*** 3.017*** 2.563*** 
 0.385 0.533 0.405 0.491 0.298 0.373 0.291 
 3.84 5.31 5.19 6.47 8.37 8.08 8.80 
B vs. A 0.608*** 0.603*** 0.806*** 1.030*** 1.084*** 1.106*** 1.040*** 
 0.110 0.122 0.129 0.146 0.107 0.111 0.113 
 5.57 4.93 6.24 7.03 10.12 9.95 9.19 
B vs. AA 1.001*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 1.277*** 1.329*** 1.367*** 1.202*** 
 0.104 0.118 0.124 0.142 0.101 0.105 0.107 
 9.61 8.22 7.85 8.98 13.11 12.99 11.28 
A vs. AA 0.393*** 0.370*** 0.167** 0.248*** 0.245*** 0.261*** 0.162** 
 0.075 0.077 0.082 0.093 0.080 0.079 0.079 
 5.25 4.83 2.04 2.66 3.05 3.32 2.06 
Note: The stars denote the p-values, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Most differences are quite large in size. Even though some of the average interest rate 
differences between A-rated and AA-rated companies are small, the standard errors of means 
are so too, thus making small differences significant. From table 4.12 only the difference 
between C- and B-rated companies in 2005 is not statistically significant at the five per cent 
significance level (grey area).   
4.2.3 Model two 
When creating model two, the control variables size, year of incorporation and liquidity ratio 
compared are added to the regression in order to understand how they influence the interest 
rate. Size is represented by the sum of assets and divided by 100. This means that the 
interpretation is the interest rate change if a company increase or decreases its size with 
NOK 100 000 (since the numbers in the data are already in thousands as well). This is done 
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as a change of NOK 1 000 is too small to expect any noticeable interest rate changes. The 
results are shown in table 4.13. 
Again, the top value for each variable in the table is the coefficient, the second value is the 
robust standard error of means and the third value is the t-value. The two former values 
together with the R
2
adj are entered as percentages. 
Table 4.13  Regression analysis, model two 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C vs. AAA 1.772*** 3.261*** 2.390*** 3.267*** 2.703*** 2.845*** 2.479*** 
 0.393 0.533 0.406 0.500 0.310 0.375 0.301 
 4.510 6.118 5.889 6.541 8.708 7.587 8.231 
B vs. AAA 1.099*** 1.320*** 1.212*** 1.332*** 1.462*** 1.141*** 1.048*** 
 0.126 0.135 0.139 0.167 0.126 0.126 0.122 
 8.714 9.753 8.703 7.985 11.587 9.046 8.595 
A vs. AAA 0.626*** 0.798*** 0.516*** 0.402*** 0.486*** 0.160 0.082 
 0.103 0.100 0.103 0.125 0.109 0.104 0.099 
 6.094 7.945 5.013 3.201 4.452 1.543 0.827 
AA vs. AAA 0.324*** 0.529*** 0.413*** 0.246** 0.386*** 0.024 0.088 
 0.097 0.094 0.095 0.119 0.102 0.096 0.089 
 3.351 5.623 4.370 2.075 3.780 0.252 0.978 
Size  
(100 000) 
-0.037*** -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
-17.904 -14.801 -12.512 -12.140 -18.122 -19.721 -20.737 
Year of 
incorp. 
-0.012*** -0.006* -0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
-3.590 -1.765 -1.348 0.652 0.946 -0.046 -1.191 
Liq. ratio 
compared 
-0.183*** -0.038** -0.087** -0.038* -0.016* -0.030*** -0.024*** 
0.048 0.016 0.035 0.020 0.009 0.011 0.007 
-3.852 -2.317 -2.450 -1.868 -1.850 -2.732 -3.684 
Constant 
(AAA) 
30.606*** 18.277*** 17.387** 4.469 1.823 8.122 15.239** 
6.537 6.601 6.961 7.989 6.578 6.420 6.245 
4.682 2.769 2.498 0.559 0.277 1.265 2.440 
F-value 72.92 60.39 45.29 44.89 96.03 96.61 99.28 
R
2
adj 4.121 3.575 3.011 2.890 4.547 4.901 4.747 
Frequency 13 470 12 051 12 265 11 431 13 947 13 002 13 165 
Note: The stars denote the p-values, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In order to reject the null hypothesis that none of the variables significantly influence the 
interest rate, the F-value has to be above 2.01 (calculated using degrees of freedom equal to 
7 and ∞). As all F-values are above this threshold, there is a 95 per cent chance that at least 
one of the coefficients is not equal to zero, each year. The results for each variable are 
presented below in the same order as in the table.  
As in model one, the signs of the credit rating codes’ coefficients are positive, indicating that 
the non-omitted rating codes possess higher interest rates than the reference rate AAA. The 
order of the size of the coefficients of the rating codes is also as in model one. Also, again, 
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the interest rate of C-rated companies is larger than the interest rate of B-rated companies, 
which again is larger than the interest rate of A-rated companies etc.  
The values of the coefficients decreased compared to model one, leading to three changes of 
statistical significance. The largest decrease in the value of the coefficients occurred between 
A- and AAA-rated companies, decreasing above 0.260 per cent both in 2010 and in 2011. 
This led to insignificant differences these years. The same applies to the interest rate 
difference between AA-rated and AAA-rated companies in 2011. These observations are 
colored grey in table 4.13, carrying t-values below the relevant threshold of 1.96. The 
interval, within which the average value lies, contains zero as a potential value (the interval 
being +/- two standard errors on both sides of the value of the coefficient).  
The significance regarding the difference between the remaining rating codes is displayed in 
table 4.14. The top value for each comparison is the coefficient, the second value is the 
robust standard error of means and the third value is the t-value. The two former values are 
entered as percentages. 
Table 4.14 Interest rate differences from credit rating code B to AA, model two 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C vs B 0.673* 1.941*** 1.178*** 1.940 1.241*** 1.704*** 1.431*** 
 0.394 0.538 0.413 0.505 0.309 0.370 0.305 
 1.71 3.61 2.86 3.83 4.02 4.52 4.69 
C vs A 1.146*** 2.463*** 1.874*** 2.866 2.218*** 2.685*** 2.397*** 
 0.387 0.530 0.402 0.493 0.302 0.370 0.297 
 2.96 4.65 4.66 5.83 7.33 7.25 8.07 
C vs AA 1.448*** 2.731*** 1.977*** 3.021 2.318*** 2.821*** 2.391*** 
 3.89 0.529 0.401 0.492 0.301 0.369 0.295 
 3.75 5.16 4.93 6.14 7.69 7.65 8.10 
B vs A 0.473*** 0.522*** 0.700*** 0.934 0.976*** 0.981*** 0.966*** 
 0.108 0.121 0.129 0.146 0.107 0.111 0.112 
 4.39 4.30 5.41 6.36 9.17 8.87 8.62 
B vs AA 0.776*** 0.790 0.799*** 1.086 1.076*** 1.116*** 0.960*** 
 0.104 0.119*** 0.124 0.144 0.102 0.106 0.106 
 7.45 6.66 6.43 7.56 10.57 10.56 9.02 
A vs AA 0.302*** 0.268*** 0.103 0.155* 0.100 0.136* -0.006 
 0.074 0.077 0.0082 0.094 0.080 0.078 0.079 
 4.06 3.49 1.25 1.66 1.24 1.73 -0.07 
Note: The stars denote the p-values, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The interest rate difference between C-rated and B-rated companies in 2005 is statistically 
significant at the ten per cent level, but not at the five per cent significance level
22
. From 
                                                 
22 In model one, this difference was not even significant at the ten per cent level. 
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2007 to 2011 the interest rate differences between A-rated and AA-rated companies are now 
deemed insignificant at the five per cent significance level. Their t-values in model one were 
just above the threshold. In model two, the values of the coefficients decreased, reducing the 
t-values to a level just below the threshold, making their interest rate differences 
insignificant.  
A company’s size is a significant factor for all years. The t-values are large compared to the 
t-values of the credit rating codes due to relatively low standard errors compared to the value 
of the coefficients. The coefficients are negative, indicating an inverse relationship between 
size and the interest rate. Larger firms have more favorable interest rates than smaller firms.  
The number of years since incorporation is a significant parameter only in 2005. In this year, 
the coefficient’s sign is negative, indicating that older companies have higher interest rates 
than younger companies. From 2006 to 2011, no statistically significant linear dependency 
between the mean interest rate and the year of incorporation was detected.  
The liquidity ratio is statistically significant in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011. The signs 
of the significant liquidity ratio compared coefficients are negative, implying that the larger a 
company’s liquidity ratio compared is, the lower the interest rate is. However, the t-values 
are low, indicating low significance of this variable compared to the other significant results. 
The constant still represents the value of the interest rate when all parameters are zero, i.e. 
the interest rate of an AAA-rated company, now also controlled for size, the year of 
incorporation and the liquidity ratio compared. However, these three latter parameters are 
never zero simultaneously
23
. Also, the constant is insignificant from 2008 to 2010. 
4.2.4 Model three 
Model three was created in order to understand how industry affiliation influences the 
interest rate of a company. Industry is a categorical variable and the real estate industry is 
chosen as the reference dummy. The results are shown in table 4.15.    
                                                 
23 Only the liquidity ratio compared can be zero; this occurred in only seven observations. 
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Again, the top value for each variable in the table is the coefficient, the second value is the 
robust standard error of means and the third value is the t-value. The two former values 
together with the R
2
adj are entered as percentages. 
Table 4.15 Regression analysis, model three 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C vs. AAA 1.757*** 3.220*** 2.491*** 3.363*** 2.727*** 2.810*** 2.450*** 
 0.389 0.524 0.396 0.499 0.311 0.378 0.296 
 4.513 6.146 6.294 6.742 8.765 7.438 8.274 
B vs. AAA 1.055*** 1.351*** 1.322*** 1.436*** 1.602*** 1.225*** 1.158*** 
 0.126 0.136 0.139 0.167 0.125 0.125 0.120 
 8.393 9.957 9.479 8.616 12.804 9.801 9.643 
A vs. AAA 0.692*** 0.896*** 0.726*** 0.665*** 0.781*** 0.393*** 0.365*** 
 0.104 0.102 0.105 0.128 0.110 0.104 0.099 
 6.670 8.753 6.948 5.191 7.115 3.774 3.690 
AA vs. AAA 0.279*** 0.528*** 0.489*** 0.336*** 0.494*** 0.086 0.141 
 0.097 0.095 0.095 0.120 0.102 0.096 0.088 
 2.880 5.575 5.160 2.806 4.844 0.895 1.593 
Size  
(100 000) 
-0.035*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.029*** 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 -16.772 -14.081 -11.519 -11.005 -16.082 -17.811 -17.918 
Age -0.008** -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.001 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 -2.431 -0.682 -0.658 1.117 1.044 0.594 -0.263 
Liq. ratio  
compared 
-0.183*** -0.038** -0.087** -0.038* -0.016* -0.031*** -0.025*** 
0.047 0.016 0.038 0.022 0.008 0.011 0.008 
 -3.940 -2.338 -2.307 -1.700 -1.951 -2.880 -3.172 
Primary 1.178*** 1.050*** 0.765*** 1.286*** 1.583*** 1.154*** 1.002*** 
 0.219 0.211 0.191 0.251 0.214 0.192 0.192 
 5.384 4.973 4.001 5.133 7.410 6.003 5.213 
Oil/gas/mining 1.160*** 1.781*** 1.014** 1.188** 2.988*** 2.437*** 1.987*** 
0.399 0.365 0.453 0.477 0.418 0.452 0.426 
 2.910 4.877 2.238 2.488 7.154 5.385 4.667 
Manufacturing 1.980*** 1.647*** 1.767*** 1.835*** 2.063*** 2.052*** 1.988*** 
0.133 0.137 0.152 0.174 0.137 0.142 0.137 
 14.860 12.008 11.651 10.527 15.010 14.467 14.516 
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Table 4.15 Regression analysis, model three continues 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Energy 0.963** 0.809** 0.702** 0.844** 0.470 0.596** 0.180 
 0.380 0.361 0.342 0.365 0.305 0.283 0.198 
 2.533 2.243 2.049 2.311 1.543 2.106 0.908 
Construction 1.888*** 1.794*** 2.057*** 2.265*** 2.515*** 2.271*** 2.161*** 
0.118 0.120 0.125 0.142 0.110 0.107 0.102 
 16.043 14.970 16.472 15.955 22.855 21.178 21.232 
Trade 2.236*** 1.937*** 1.797*** 2.085*** 2.434*** 2.257*** 2.355*** 
 0.108 0.109 0.115 0.131 0.102 0.101 0.099 
 20.768 17.785 15.606 15.940 23.824 22.258 23.870 
Shipping 0.816* 1.169*** 0.774* 0.673 1.000*** 1.544*** 1.227*** 
 0.425 0.371 0.397 0.572 0.273 0.357 0.409 
 1.919 3.152 1.951 1.178 3.656 4.329 3.002 
Tele/IT 1.104*** 0.929*** 1.129*** 1.252*** 1.538*** 1.284*** 1.279*** 
 0.121 0.123 0.132 0.149 0.117 0.116 0.109 
 9.135 7.558 8.549 8.411 13.148 11.067 11.743 
Travel 1.681*** 1.025*** 0.999*** 0.889*** 1.044*** 0.974*** 0.948*** 
 0.239 0.236 0.264 0.301 0.255 0.269 0.270 
 7.048 4.351 3.788 2.951 4.094 3.623 3.511 
Services 1.528*** 1.180*** 1.289*** 1.334*** 1.652*** 1.434*** 1.402*** 
 0.128 0.132 0.139 0.157 0.124 0.118 0.116 
 11.898 8.970 9.246 8.492 13.313 12.111 12.086 
Public 0.785*** 0.463*** 0.449*** 0.530*** 1.105*** 0.993*** 1.025*** 
 0.131 0.132 0.136 0.154 0.125 0.123 0.113 
 5.977 3.509 3.298 3.436 8.842 8.108 9.088 
Constant 
(AAA and real 
estate) 
21.116*** 9.705 11.052 -0.994 -0.786 2.260 7.557 
6.433 6.605 6.965 8.012 6.477 6.282 6.056 
3.283 1.469 1.587 -0.124 -0.121 0.360 1.248 
F-value 61.69 46.96 40.68 40.86 82.92 78.08 85.75 
R
2
adj 7.057 6.345 5.636 5.540 8.143 8.441 8.558 
Frequency 13 470 12 051 12 265 11 431 13 947 13 002 13 165 
Note: The stars denote the p-values, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The F-values are all above the threshold of 1.83 (calculated using degrees of freedom equal 
to 18 and ∞). There is thus a 95 per cent chance that at least one of the coefficients are not 
equal to zero, each year.  
When moving from model two to model three, the signs of the coefficients of the credit 
rating codes as well as the order of the size of the coefficients are the same. Regarding the 
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significance, almost all t-values of the credit rating codes increased
24
. The interest rate 
differences between A-rated and AAA-rated companies in 2010 and 2011 are again 
significant, as in model one.  
The significance regarding the difference between the remaining rating codes is displayed in 
table 4.16. The top value for each comparison is the coefficient, the second value is the 
robust standard error of means and the third value is the t-value. The two former values are 
entered as percentages. 
Table 4.16 Interest rate differences from credit rating code B to AA, model three 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C vs. B 0.702* 1.869*** 1.169*** 1.927*** 1.125*** 1.585*** 1.292*** 
 0.390 0.529 0.402 0.504 0.308 0.380 0.300 
 1.80 3.54 2.91 3.82 3.65 4.18 4.31 
C vs. A 1.065*** 2.325*** 1.770*** 2.698*** 1.946*** 2.420*** 2.085*** 
 0.383 0.521 0.391 0.493 0.303 0.373 0.293 
 2.78 4.46 4.51 5.47 6.43 6.47 7.13 
C vs. AA 1.478*** 2.692*** 2.002*** 3.028*** 2.234*** 2.724*** 2.309*** 
 0.382 0.520 0.390 0.492 0.302 0.372 0.290 
 3.87 5.18 5.13 6.16 7.41 7.33 7.96 
B vs. A 0.363*** 0.456*** 0.596*** 0.771*** 0.821*** 0.831*** 0.793*** 
 0.106 0.120 0.127 0.144 0.104 0.108 0.110 
 3.42 3.80 4.70 5.37 7.88 7.68 7.23 
B vs. AA 0.776*** 0.822*** 0.833*** 1.100*** 1.109*** 1.139*** 1.016*** 
 0.103 0.117 0.123 0.141 0.100 0.104 0.104 
 7.56 7.00 6.76 7.78 11.11 10.96 9.75 
A vs. AA 0.413*** 0.367*** 0.237*** 0.329*** 0.288*** 0.309*** 0.224*** 
 0.074 0.077 0.082 0.093 0.079 0.078 0.078 
 5.58 4.80 2.88 3.54 3.62 3.94 2.86 
Note: The stars denote the p-values, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The difference between C- and B-rated companies in 2005 is statistically significant at the 
ten per cent significance level, but not at the five per cent level. This coincides with the 
results in model two. The interest rate differences between A-rated and AA-rated companies 
from 2007 to 2011 are yet again significant. 
The statistical significance of a company’s size, year of incorporation and liquidity ratio 
compared is the same as in model two. Size is significant for all years, the year of 
incorporation is only significant in 2005 and the liquidity ratio compared is insignificant in 
                                                 
24 Most of the time the increase was caused by larger coefficients, and sometimes it was caused by smaller standard error of 
means, or the combination of both. 
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2008 and 2009. The relationships these three variables have to the interest rate are still 
inverse.  
The coefficients of the industry categories depict how much the average interest rates differ 
due to their industry affiliation, given that all other parameters are kept constant. The chosen 
reference dummy could have been any industry, but the real estate industry was chosen in 
order to ease the interpretation of the results. As real estate companies have the lowest 
average interest rate each year, all coefficients have the same sign; positive. The standard 
errors of means of the industries show the interest rate variations within the relevant industry 
category. This is because the variations between industries are kept constant through 
allowing dummy variables to represent the industries in the model.  
The interest rate differences among industries are statistically significant at a five per cent 
significance level for the observations that are not colored grey in table 4.15. The grey areas 
consist of companies affiliated with the energy industry in 2009 and 2011 and the shipping 
industry in 2005, 2007 and 2008. It is the combination of low coefficient values and 
relatively high standard errors that makes these observations insignificant. From the 
coefficients it is clear that trade, construction, manufacturing and oil/gas/mining are the 
industries that contribute with the highest interest rates compared to real estate’s interest rate, 
and thus also overall, as was depicted in figure 4.6 in the descriptive analysis.  
When entering two dummy variables, one for the credit rating codes and one for the 
industries, there are two dimensions to consider when interpreting the constant. Now, when 
the coefficients of all the included variables are zero, the constant term depicts the interest 
rate of an AAA-rated real estate company. However, again, the parameters included in the 
model are never zero simultaneously and the constants are not paid attention to. It is also 
insignificant in six out of seven years.  
4.2.5 The coefficient of determination 
The coefficient of determination is not emphasized in this thesis, as a focus around the 
significance of each variable has been preferred. Nevertheless, the development is illustrated 
in figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12 The coefficient of determination 
Model one has an R
2
adj spanning from 1.202 per cent to 2.245 per cent. When adding control 
variables in model two, the explanatory power decreases steadily towards 2008, before it 
increases. Model two has an R
2
adj between 2.890 per cent to 4.901 per cent. When including 
the industry variables, the explanatory power follows the same pattern as in model two, 
however, with an increased R
2
adj from 5.540 per cent to 8.558 per cent
25
.  
Based on the results, the credit rating codes, the size, the liquidity ratios compared and the 
industry categories contribute to explain the variations in the interest rate to different 
degrees. The influence of the credit rating codes on the interest rates is seemingly robust, as 
the results for these variables do not change much when control variables are added. The 
preciseness of the calculation of the codes’ effect on a company’s average interest rate is 
thus also verified.  
 
                                                 
25 The numbers are the minimum and maximum values, not the values in 2005 and 2011. 
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5. Discussion, implications and conclusion 
The results are put into context and discussed before the implications of the report are 
addressed. The second sub-section includes suggestions for further research. The conclusion 
completes the thesis. 
5.1 Discussion 
One of the questions mentioned in the introduction was what is an interest rate? -and in 
short, it has been established that it is the price of money. The calculation of the price of 
money depends on the second sub-question what is creditworthiness? Creditworthiness is the 
calculation of the probability of repayment of credit principals and interest costs. The level 
of worthiness is attributed to companies by applying credit rating codes. These cover a broad 
area of parameters in order to portray a most accurate picture of the relevant credit risk 
within one single symbol. The hypothesis in this thesis is that the interest rate decreases 
when creditworthiness increases. The following discussion confirms this hypothesis.  
The regression results of each variable are discussed separately. Supplementary information 
derived from the descriptive statistics is added where appropriate. Economic significance is 
also addressed simultaneously. This creates a clear disposition.  
The causality between the dependent variable and the independent variables was reviewed 
applying three multiple regression models. In all models the average interest rates of the 
credit rating codes lay in the expected order each year. Companies rated C pay relatively 
higher interests than companies rated B and these again pay relatively higher interests than 
companies rated A etc. The expectation of the order is caused by the assumption of risk 
aversion. Higher risk entails a requirement of higher compensation.  
In model one, only two results were insignificant. When moving from model one to model 
two, eight additional credit rating results are insignificant
26
. This was caused by the fact that 
some of the effects previously captured by the credit rating codes are now being captured by 
the added control variables. While the standard errors stayed almost constant, the 
                                                 
26 When considering the statistical significance level at five per cent. 
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coefficients decreased. The insignificance includes differences between A- and AAA-rated 
companies, AA- and AAA- rated companies and A- and AA-rated companies. This indicates 
that the creditors do not punish companies much for a downgraded credit rating code if they 
at least hold a rating containing an “A”.  
In model three, the coefficients increased compared to the values held in model two. The 
original levels held in model one were almost reached. This indicates that the true effect of 
credit rating codes is underestimated when the industry variables were left out. The 
difference between the average interest rates of all credit rating codes are statistically 
significant at the five per cent significance level except between AAA- and AA-rated 
companies in 2010, and between B- and C-rated companies in 2005. The difference in the 
average interest rate between B- and C-rated companies is significant and at least above one 
per cent for all other years except for in 2005. The large standard error of means relative to 
the value of the coefficient is caused by the limited number of observations. This leads to the 
insignificance of the interest rate in 2005. Had there been more C-rated companies in the 
sample, it is expected that the difference would be significant. This specific observation of 
insignificance is thus not considered a continuous tendency. 
Applicable to all models, it is evident that the time period of the sample plays an important 
role in deciding the average interest rate. Looking at the illustration of the interest rate over 
time in figure 4.1 in the descriptive statistics, the peak in 2008 is very visible. Obviously, 
this peak was triggered by the financial crisis. After the crisis, the average interest rate did 
not return to its level prior to the crisis, but stabilized almost half a percentage point above. 
When dividing the interest rate into the categories of the credit rating codes, the same time 
pattern emerged for all codes. However, the large interest rate increase of C-rated companies 
from 2005 to 2006 was not expected. It might be a result of having too few observations of 
C-rated companies, as there were only 73 observations of these in 2006. However, there are 
few observations of C-rated companies each year. The reason for the pattern may have been 
brought on by a concern regarding the overheating of the market, thus “punishing” the most 
risky companies by demanding higher interest rate. However, the expectation is that all 
credit rating codes should be influenced in the same direction, like they do in the other years. 
2006 was even the year with the lowest number of defaulted companies since 1998, see 
attachment 7.5. There is no clear explanation for the interest rate jump of C-rated companies 
from 2005 to 2006. 
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As mentioned earlier, a statistical significance level at five per cent indicates that there is a 
maximum five per cent chance of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis. However, statistical 
significance of the results alone is not adequate for assessing the “importance” of a variable. 
When a sample is large enough, statistical significance can be obtained even when the effect 
is miniscule. Economic (or substantive) significance reaches beyond statistics. This type of 
significance can be measured by asking “so what?” or “how much does it matter?” (Miller & 
Rodgers, 2008).   
How likely is it that a company’s credit rating code changes? In other words, how likely is it 
that the differences detected in the analysis in fact influences a company? In table 5.1, the 
changes in the credit rating codes in the sample are documented as percentages. The row to 
the left is the initial code and the columns represent the credit rating codes after the change.  
Table 5.1 Credit rating code changes within companies 
 C 
(%) 
B 
(%) 
A 
(%) 
AA 
(%) 
AAA 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
C 44.59  27.97 17.41  9.23  0.79  100.00  
B 2.43  42.05 28.27  23.92  3.32  100.00  
A 0.88 13.87 48.26  32.31  4.69  100.00  
AA 0.27 4.73  18.89  57.70  18.42 100.00  
AAA  0.15 1.36  6.52  42.58  49.39 100.00  
Note: If the same company is down- or upgraded twice, these are reported as two observations. 
 
The number of credit rating code changes is rather substantial. B-rated companies switch 
rating codes most frequently, with 57.95 per cent
27
 down- or upgrades between 2005 and 
2011. An upgrade is almost always more likely than a downgrade. The threshold for 
downgrading a company from any other rating code to a C-rating is large. This is natural 
when keeping Bisnode’s wording on C-ratings in mind. “...weak or bad economy with severe 
payment remarks”.  
The frequent occurrence of a credit rating changes has been established. The statistical 
significance and economic consequences can be read from the tables presented in the section 
regarding results. An interest rate effect is most important when both the statistical and the 
economic significance are present and the change occurs frequently.  
                                                 
27 100 per cent - 42.05 per cent. 
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When moving one notch from the AA-rating, insignificant results are detected in both 
directions. Therefore, despite the frequent changes occurring from a company rated AA seen 
in table 5.1, these are not expected to lead to large interest rate changes. The interest rate 
difference between the A- and the AAA-rating is deemed insignificant twice in model two, 
but are significant again in model three, when including the industry categories. Changes 
between these two credit rating codes do not occur frequently. The changes from C- to B-
rating are frequent as well as economically significant. Generally, they are also considered 
statistically significant, regardless of the single insignificant occurrence in 2005. The one-
notch change between a B-rating and an A-rating occurs frequently and is also deemed both 
statistically and economically significant.  
The remaining changes refer to statistically significant changes where multiple notches are 
taken in one swap, and the economic consequences are rather large. Surprisingly, there are 
many upgrades from a C-rating to an A-rating as well from a B-rating to an AA-rating.  
It is not given that it is easy for a company to change a credit rating code in a favorable 
direction. It takes effort to improve company ratios and other parameters influencing the 
credit rating. However, with knowledge of and focus on these parameters, it may be 
achievable. 
When a firm’s size increases, the reductions in its interest rate is statistically significant for 
all three models. This result signalizes the same as Petersen and Rajan (1994) did in their 
study. The large size of the debtor reduces the perceived risk of borrowing money to him/her 
and a “discount” embodied as a lower interest rate is thus given by the creditor. However, 
the economic effect is minor. When size increases with NOK 100 000 (which is a possible 
outcome as the average size is NOK 2 410 000), the coefficients in the models show that the 
interest rate decreases approximately 0.02 to 0.04 per cent. This does not benefit the debtor 
much. The definition of size should also be evaluated. An increased size can be financed by 
both debt and/or equity. If a firm’s increased asset stock is financed by debt, this would most 
likely not lead to a decreased interest rate, and also not to an increased securitization 
opportunity. This fact may have contributed to reduce the impact of a change in size on the 
interest rate. Also, if assets are debt financed they will hardly qualify as security. 
The assumption regarding the year of incorporation was that well-established companies, 
having been in the business for longer periods, would be more able to acquire favorable 
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deals with creditors. The year of incorporation is only significant in 2005 in all three models 
and the results express that older companies hold higher interest rates than younger 
companies. This is the opposite of what was expected by Eklund, Larsen, and Bernhardsen 
(2001) and Svendsen (2005). Generally, it is not expected that younger companies will 
receive more favorable interest rates than older companies. However, the economic 
consequence is scarce. According to the regression results in model three, aging a 100 years 
would lead to an increased interest rate of 0.800 per cent, if other variables were kept 
constant. Overall, this variable is not considered an influential variable due to the large 
amount of insignificant results.  
Contributing even more to the weak results is the fact that, for some years of incorporation, 
the average interest rate is calculated based on a small number of observations. For example 
in 1870, there were three observations and the average interest rate was calculated as 1.526 
per cent. In 1885 there were four observations and the average interest rate was 9.391 per 
cent. Having a small number of observations makes the results less trustworthy. 
In model three, the liquidity ratio compared is significant in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010 and 
2011. On the one hand, this indicates that variables compared to industry averages indeed 
can be important factors, which Bisnode should consider adding to their model. On the other 
hand, the large standard errors compared to the value of the coefficients contribute to make 
the t-values low. This implies uncertainty around the value and thus only modest 
significance. Also, changing the liquidity ratio compared by one whole unit is difficult. If a 
company has a liquidity ratio of one and the industry has a ratio of two, the company has to 
triple its liquidity ratio in order to increase the liquidity ratio compared by one unit. And this 
only applies if the industry liquidity ratio keeps constant. Even when this is achieved, the 
positive gains are small. In model three the interest rate decreases, on average, 0.073 per cent 
if the liquidity ratio compared increases by one unit
28
. A reason contributing to the small 
effect may be the spread of the distribution of the variable. The variable is self-generated by 
the author of this thesis and comprises two fractions. Depending on the relative size of these 
fractions, the values can become very large, increasing the distribution of the spread and 
greatly influencing the results. 
                                                 
28 Only the significant results are included in the calculation. 
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The interest rate differences among industries are large, therefore, the risk associated with 
different industries is assumed to vary considerably. Trade, construction, manufacturing and 
oil/gas/mining are the industries contributing with the highest average interest rates 
compared to real estate’s interest rate. The performances of these industries are dependent on 
economic cycles. The time pattern discussed in conjunction with the credit rating codes may 
of course also influence the average interest rates affiliated to different industry categories. 
Trade and construction were especially hit by the financial crisis, holding average interest 
rates above ten per cent in 2008. According to Svendsen (2005), these two sectors have the 
greatest risk of default. In 2009, the average interest rate noticeably decreased for all 
industries except the oil/gas/mining industry. This coincides with the spot crude oil price 
decreasing approximately 37 per cent from 2008 to 2009, due to the reduced demand caused 
by the economic setback (OPEC, 2013). This industry would thus suffer from the crisis in a 
longer time period than other industries. Real estate is the industry with the lowest average 
interest rates, as a company within this industry has good opportunities to provide security 
for its loans, mentioned in section 2.1. The same applies to the energy industry, if it entails 
power plants, and the shipping industry, with its ship supply (however, the value of ships 
may vary considerably). The interest rate difference between an energy company and a real 
estate company is insignificant in three out of seven years. The companies affiliated with the 
energy industry are also the only companies that reach a lower level of average interest rate 
after the crisis as prior to the crisis. The difference between real estate’s interest rate and 
shipping’s interest rate is insignificant in three out of seven years (before the crisis). All 
other industries have statistically significant and larger average interest rates than the real 
estate business. Even though the differences in interest rates among industries are considered 
large, most most companies only rarely change industry affiliation within its existence (it has 
happened 300 times in this data set). Thus companies cannot actively use this knowledge to 
gain more favorable interest rates.  
The partly unexplained increase in the interest rate of C-rated companies from 2005 to 2006 
is not an apparent pattern within the industries.   
The R2adj of model one is weak. During the financial crisis it slightly increases. Greater 
interest rate differences between AAA-rated and C-rated companies were detected and C-
rated companies were especially “punished” for belonging to this category. The amount of 
defaults also started increasing (attachment 7.5) and the credit rating codes were able to 
capture some of this.  
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Even though the R
2
adj of model two and three are larger than that of model one, the level of 
explanatory power is still low. The relatively larger increase in the R
2
adj in 2008 presented in 
model two compared to model one (the steeper slope in figure 4.12) may be caused by 
market players acting safer, and thus starting to undergo more thorough risk evaluations 
beyond credit ratings. With the unstable market situation in mind, a creditor may deem it 
necessary to evaluate a greater sphere around a potential debtor in order to cover the risks 
appropriately.  
5.2 Implications 
As the interest rate is generated on an aggregated level, the conclusion only applies to that 
level. It would be preferable to be able to link interest rates to their original sources and to 
analyze each credit category’s interest rate level in light of a company’s assigned credit 
rating code. At least gaining more knowledge on the “unspecified long-term financial debt” 
would increase this opportunity. Perhaps some credits are given at more favorable rates than 
others, and underlying reasons could be sought out. However, obtaining more details 
regarding the dependent variable could easily have made the study too large, considering the 
scope and time limits. 
As mentioned in section 3.8 regarding validity, the size of the companies’ interest rates have 
not been weighed with the size of their interest-bearing debt, allowing each company’s 
interest rate to matter equally. It is expected that the preciseness of the results would increase 
if the interest rates in the data set could be weighed. This would not allow small loans to 
impact the results equally to large loans, as is the case in this paper.  
Four control variables were selected. Using even more could increase accuracy. The rating 
codes consist of aggregated information and many potential control variables deriving from 
the accounts were already a part of these codes. However, information regarding securities 
would, for example, be of interest. This variable was included in the data set, but with too 
few observations. As the goal of this thesis was to analyze the relationship between the 
average interest rate and the credit rating codes, the information in the data set was, 
nevertheless, sufficient.  
Despite not being discussed in details, not all credit is extended based on rational credit 
evaluations. At times, the competitive ambience may steer the price of credit. A strong 
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economy leading to intensified competition towards credit customers may result in interest 
rates being competed downwards, even lower than a credit evaluation would predict. This 
effect could perhaps be captured by applying more macroeconomic parameters, influencing 
the demand and supply of credit. These parameters change over time and the data must thus 
be handled as panel data. A simplified solution could be to extract the effect of time by 
adding dummy variables representing each year. 
Further research can be based on resolving the implications mentioned above. Other issues 
extending this thesis could be expanding the sample by adding additional years. A large 
sample contributes to make conclusions more reliable. The initial data set had over 3 million 
observations. One of the limitations of SNF’s data set was that the credit rating codes were 
only available in seven out of 20 years. This reduced the sample greatly. There were also 
very few C-rated companies, making these observations less trustworthy.  
Experian’s credit rating codes could be included and compared to Bisnode’s rating codes, 
endeavoring to detect potential rating code differences and to search for underlying reasons. 
For credit issued by institutions with internal credit rating procedures, it would also be of 
interest to match their codes with Bisnode’s codes. To what extent do Bisnode’s codes differ 
from the credit extender’s internal credit rating codes?  
If focus is kept on Bisnode, its rating foundation could be split up in its four main pillars 
mentioned in section 3.5.2, observing at what extent each aspect influences the interest rate 
relative to each other.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Based on current knowledge, the main research question has been answered. Increased 
creditworthiness leads to a decreased average interest rate, and the relationship is statistically 
significant. In other words, the worthiness level attributed to a firm through credit rating 
codes clearly contributes to dictate the level of the interest rate of a company.  However, one 
should be careful applying this conclusion to the interest rate deviations between AA- and 
AAA-rated companies as well as between AA- and A-rated companies. The reason is a 
detection of insignificant results, which are also expected to continue in the future.  
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These findings lead to the assumption that creditors accept a certain amount of credit risk as 
long as it is reflected in the interest rate. This result is comprehensible as risk aversion is 
assumed to be fundamental in the average Norwegian mind-set.  
The credit rating codes of Bisnode are not part of any nation-wide regulations, like the rating 
codes of the big three CRAs are. Nevertheless, the frequent rating code changes detected 
together with the evident economic consequences underline the impact of Bisnode’s codes 
on the average interest rates of Norwegian companies. These companies should thus be 
aware of the key indicators applied by Bisnode in its AAA-rating system.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Registered and certified CRAs in the European Union 
Name of CRAs 
Euler Hermes Rating GmbH 
Japan Credit Rating Agency Ltd 
Feri EuroRating Services AG 
BCRA-Credit Rating Agency AD 
Creditreform Rating AG 
Scope Ratings GmbH 
ICAP Group SA 
GBB-Rating Gesellschaft für Bonitätsbeurteilung GmbH 
Assekurata, Assekuranz rating-Agentur GmbH 
ARC Ratings, S.A. (previously Companhia Portuguesa de Rating, S.A) 
AM Best Europe-Rating Services Ltd. (AMBERS) 
DBRS Ratings Limited 
Fitch France S.A.S. 
Fitch Deutschland GmbH 
Fitch Italia S.p.A. 
Fitch Polska S.A. 
Fitch Ratings España S.A.U. 
Fitch Ratings Limited 
Fitch Ratings CIS Limited 
Moody’s Investors Service Cyprus Ltd 
Moody’s France S.A.S. 
Moody’s Deutschland GmbH 
Moody’s Italia S.r.l. 
Moody’s Investors Service España S.A. 
Moody’s Investors Service Ltd 
Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services France S.A.S. 
Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services Italy S.r.l. 
Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services Europe Limited 
CRIF S.p.A. 
Capital Intelligence (Cyprus) Ltd 
European Rating Agency, a.s. 
Axesor SA 
Cerved Rating Agency S.p.A. (previoulsy CERVED Group S.p.A. ) 
Kroll Bond Rating Agency 
The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd 
Dagong Europe Credit Rating Srl (Dagong Europe) 
Spread Research 
EuroRating Sp. z o.o. 
Source: (ESMA, 2014) 
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7.2 Registered NRSROs in the United States 
Name of CRAs 
A.M. Best Company, Inc. 
DBRS, Inc. 
Egan-Jones Ratings Co. 
Fitch, Inc. 
HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V. 
Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. 
Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 
Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC 
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services 
Source: (SEC, 2014 a) 
7.3 The distribution of the residuals in q-q plots, model one 
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7.4 The distribution of the residuals in q-q plots, model 
three 
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7.5 The development of defaults from 1992 to 2013 
 
Note: Tvangsavviklinger= Forced liquidations, Konkurser= Defaults 
When printed in black and white, the top part of the histograms starting from 1998 is the forced liquidations. 
Source: Per Einar Ruud, with permission to copy 
 
7.6 Stata commands for processing the data  
*Generating the interest rate variable 
bysort orgnr (aar): gen interest_rate=(2*rentekost)/(rgjeld_min + rgjeld_min[_n-1]) /// 
if rgjeld_min[_n-1]!=. & rgjeld_min!=. & rgjeld_min>0 & rgjeld_min[_n-1]>0  
gen interest_rate100=interest_rate*100  
 
*Generating the rating codes as dummy variables 
tab ratingkode, generate(ratingD) 
 
*Generating the industries as dummy variables 
tab bransje, generate(bransjeD) 
 
*Generating the size variable 
bysort orgnr (aar): gen snitt_sumeiend=((sumeiend + sumeiend[_n-1])/2) 
gen snitt_sumeiend100=snitt_sumeiend/100 
 
*Generating the liquidity ratio compared variable 
gen snitt_oml=((oml+oml[_n-1])/2) 
gen snitt_kgjeld=((kgjeld+kgjeld[_n-1])/2) 
bysort orgnr (aar): gen snitt_lr=snitt_oml/snitt_kgjeld 
bysort bransje: egen snitt_lrbransje=mean(snitt_lr) 
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gen snitt_lr_på_bransje=snitt_lr/snitt_lrbransje 
 
 
*Processing the data  
keep if ratingkode>0 
keep if ratingkode<9 
keep if aktiv==1 
drop if konkaar!=0 
 
drop if mors_orgnr!=.  //group posts in the income statement:  
drop if invdtrres!=0 
drop if invtsres!=0 
drop if rentintkons!=0 
drop if rentekostkon!=0 
drop if minintr!=0  
drop if konsbid!=0  
drop if invdtr!=0             //group posts in the balance sheet 
drop if invkonsbal!=0 
drop if laankonl!=0 
drop if laankonk!=0 
drop if laanan!=0 
drop if andrinv!=0 
drop if aksjkons!=0 
drop if konsgl!=0 
drop if konsgk!=0 
drop if skyldkid!=0 
drop if minintbal!=0 
 
keep if salgsinn>0  
drop if oml<0 
drop if anl<0 
keep if ek>0 
drop if kgjeld<0 
drop if lgjeld<0 
 
keep if interest_rate>0 
 
keep if selskat==1          // limited liability only  
drop if bransje==10       // no finance 
drop if bransje==13       // no R&D 
drop if eierstruktur==5   // no public  
 
*removing missing data 
keep if bransje!=. 
keep if stiftaar!=. 
keep if interest_rate!=. 
 
*testing for missing data 
misstable summarize  
 
*Replacing obvious input errors 
replace stiftaar = 2000 if stiftaar==2 
replace stiftaar = 1990 if stiftaar==1.99 
replace stiftaar = 2001 if stiftaar==2.01 
 
*Keeping relevant years 
keep if aar>2004 
 
*** 
*Trimming the data set 
*Applying the 95 percentile to certain posts 
*PS, this is executed for each year separately 
*** 
egen p95_oml=pctile(oml), p(95) 
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drop if oml>p95_oml 
 
egen p95_anl=pctile(anl), p(95) 
drop if anl>p95_anl 
 
egen p95_ek=pctile(ek), p(95) 
drop if ek>p95_ek 
 
egen p95_kgjeld=pctile(kgjeld), p(95) 
drop if kgjeld>p95_kgjeld 
 
egen p95_lgjeld=pctile(lgjeld), p(95) 
drop if lgjeld>p95_lgjeld 
 
egen p95_salgsinn=pctile(salgsinn), p(95) 
drop if salgsinn>p95_salgsinn 
 
egen p95=pctile(interest_rate), p(95) 
drop if interest_rate>p95 
 
*regression model one 
bysort aar: reg interest_rate100 ratingD1 ratingD2 ratingD3 ratingD4, /// 
robust cluster(orgnr) 
 
*regression model two 
bysort aar: reg interest_rate100 ratingD1 ratingD2 ratingD3 ratingD4 /// 
snitt_sumeiend100 stiftaar snitt_lr_på_bransje, robust cluster(orgnr)  
 
*regression model three 
bysort aar: reg interest_rate100 ratingD1 ratingD2 ratingD3 ratingD4 /// 
snitt_sumeiend100 stiftaar snitt_lr_på_bransje bransjeD1 bransjeD2 ///  
bransjeD3 bransjeD4 bransjeD5 bransjeD6 bransjeD7 bransjeD8 /// 
bransjeD9 bransjeD11 bransjeD12, robust cluster(orgnr)  
 
 
 
 
 
